

Office of Inspector General

City of New Orleans

NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT STAFFING AND DEPLOYMENT

**MEETING THE DEMAND OF CITIZEN
CALLS FOR SERVICE WITH EXISTING RESOURCES**

**E. R. Quatrevaux
Inspector General**

Final Report

May 28, 2014

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS



ED QUATREVAUX
INSPECTOR GENERAL

May 28, 2014

Re: New Orleans Police Department Staffing and Deployment: Meeting the Need of Citizen Calls for Service with Existing Resources

I certify that the inspector general personnel assigned to this project are free of personal or other external impairments to independence.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'E.R. Quatrevaux', is positioned above the printed name.

E.R. Quatrevaux
Inspector General

NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT STAFFING AND DEPLOYMENT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Inspector General of the City of New Orleans (OIG) conducted an evaluation of New Orleans Police Department's (NOPD) force structure, focusing on the department's staffing and deployment to answer citizen-generated calls for service. The objectives of the evaluation were to describe and assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization of personnel to carry out the department's mission "to provide professional police services to the public."¹

Answering citizen-generated calls for service is a non-discretionary policing activity and the baseline for providing "professional police services to the public;" even the most serious crime often begins as a citizen-generated call for service. Evaluators employed a workload-based analysis² to assess the management of NOPD's citizen call-for-service delivery system and to identify opportunities for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of NOPD staffing and deployment in order to meet the call-for service demand.

The model called for an analysis of NOPD's citizen call-for-service workload and resulted in an estimation of the number of officers who needed to be assigned to answer calls for service depending on the portion of their time spent on calls. Built into the model was the opportunity for police managers to balance time spent on calls with a determination of how much of officers' time would be spent on discretionary policing activities, such as proactive and community policing, and administrative duties.

For instance, if police managers decided that 50 percent of officers' time should be spent answering calls for service, officers would spend the remaining 50 percent of their time on other policing responsibilities. If police managers wanted officers to devote 30 percent of their time to calls for service, officers would have the remaining 70 percent of their

¹ New Orleans Police Department, *Policy Manual*, 2012.

² Dr. Alexander Weiss, a recognized expert in the field of police staffing, was selected through a competitive procurement process to consult on this project. He conducted data collection and the workload-based analysis with the assistance of OIG evaluators.

time for other policing activities, and the department would need more officers devoting a portion of their time to answering calls.

Evaluators found that in May 2013 most platoons were not sufficiently staffed to meet the demand of citizen-generated calls for service at 50 or 40 percent time spent on calls for service. Of the approximately 1,000 Police Officers I–IV, 251 officers were assigned to platoons responsible for answering calls for service. Evaluators identified findings related to the scheduling, dispatch procedures, and categorization of calls for service:

- NOPD classified 37 percent of citizen calls for service in “complaint other” and “disturbance other” categories, making it difficult for supervisors to use the data to inform NOPD staffing and deployment needs.
- NOPD primarily used two priority codes for 98 percent of all citizen-generated calls for service, reducing the department’s ability to prioritize responses to the calls for service effectively and efficiently.
- Districts held calls for service—predominantly less urgent Code One calls, more than half of the total citizen-generated calls—in queue before and during shift changes. The practice resulted in long wait times for callers and a backlog of calls awaiting officers as they started their shifts.
- Arrival times were not recorded for 13 percent of citizens’ calls for service, and evaluators could not determine whether the 87 percent of calls for service with arrival times would be representative of the entire population of calls. Without arrival times, evaluators could not calculate reliable response times or on-scene times.

Evaluators then examined NOPD staffing and deployment to identify ways to meet the citizen call-for-service demand. Evaluators identified opportunities for (1) increasing the supply of officers available to answer calls for service using existing manpower resources, and (2) decreasing the number of calls that require an officer to respond through the use of alternatives employed by numerous cities across the country. Evaluators recommended:

- Assigning sworn officers only to those positions that require law enforcement training, expertise, or experience.
- Increasing supervisors' span of control; NOPD supervisors managed an average of 3.1 to 4.3 officers, well below the national average.
- Developing alternative methods for reporting minor traffic accidents and responding to burglar alarms, which together totaled 21 percent of all citizen-generated calls for service.

It is the task of police executives to decide how many officers will be assigned to answer calls for service and how much time those officers will spend answering calls for service apart from proactive and community policing, and other discretionary and administrative police activities. They must balance those decisions against other important demands on personnel resources.

However, when financial resources are limited, department managers must demonstrate that existing resources are maximized and convince city officials that their choices meet real needs, are driven by solid data, and are financially justified.

A draft of this report was provided to the CAO's Office and the New Orleans Police Department for review and comment prior to publication. The City's full response is appended to this report.

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OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY, SECTION I

The Office of Inspector General for the City of New Orleans (OIG) conducted an evaluation of the New Orleans Police Department's (NOPD) force structure. "Force structure" analyses describe and assess the organization of personnel to carry out the department's mission, operations, and activities. The objectives of this evaluation were to answer the following questions:

1. How many sworn and non-sworn officers are currently employed by the NOPD?¹
2. Is NOPD sufficiently staffed and organized to complete its mission efficiently and effectively?
3. How many sworn officers are needed to respond to calls for service, conduct preventative and proactive patrol tasks, while also meeting the administrative requirements for each shift in the eight police districts?
4. How can NOPD increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its current force structure?

OIG personnel and a representative from NOPD selected Dr. Alexander Weiss as the primary technical consultant for the project through a competitive selection process for professional services. Work on the project began in late June 2013. Dr. Weiss provided information on performance standards and best practices, conducted data collection and analysis, and contributed language to and commented on drafts of the report. OIG evaluators assisted Dr. Weiss in conducting interviews and obtaining data from the City of New Orleans and NOPD.²

**Consultants'
Biographies**

¹ Sworn officers are Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) certified. The P.O.S.T. Council for Louisiana and La. R.S. 40:2402 define "peace officer" as any full-time employee of the state, municipality, sheriff, or other public agency, whose permanent duties include: making an arrest, performing searches and seizures or executing criminal warrants; prevention or detection of crime; or enforcement of penal, traffic, or highway laws. In contrast, the term "non-sworn" describes NOPD employees who are not commissioned law enforcement officers. Some law enforcement agencies refer to these employees as "civilian" or "professional."

² For purposes of this report, the term "evaluators" includes Dr. Alexander Weiss unless otherwise noted. The OIG assumes all responsibility for the information contained in this report, including findings and recommendations.

Dr. Weiss and OIG evaluators interviewed the NOPD Superintendent, deputy superintendents, commanders of police districts and divisions, Orleans Parish Communications District personnel, and staff from City Council offices regarding NOPD policies, procedures, and operations related to calls for service, staffing, and deployment.

The analysis used 2012 NOPD citizen-generated calls for service data, employee payroll records, state supplemental pay reports, leave records, and relevant NOPD job descriptions, policies, and procedures to determine NOPD's current staffing and operational needs, focusing on answering citizen-generated calls for service, the non-discretionary baseline of police services.³

Evaluators also analyzed 2013 Manpower Reports to determine the current deployment of personnel resources to determine if the operational needs of the NOPD could be fulfilled more effectively and efficiently.⁴

This evaluation was performed in accordance with Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews and includes findings and recommendations relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of the City of New Orleans Police Department's force strength and deployment.⁵

³ Citizen-generated calls for service include all calls made by citizens requesting police assistance.

⁴ Manpower Reports provide a snapshot of the current staffing on the day the report is generated. Evaluators requested a May 2013 Manpower Report in order to use the most recent staffing numbers and deployment information available at the time of the analysis. Payroll and other employee records from 2012 were used for analyses that required a full year of data.

⁵ "Quality Standards for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews by Offices of Inspector General," *Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General* (Association of Inspectors General, 2004).

Many New Orleanians accept as an article of faith the assertion that the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) is understaffed. Yet the steady drumbeat for a larger police force and claims of a police force in “crisis” continue in the absence of verifiable evidence documenting NOPD’s personnel and operational needs. Toward that end, the OIG conducted an empirical analysis of NOPD’s manpower requirements based on an assessment of NOPD’s workload.

NOPD’s stated mission is:

[T]o provide professional police services to the public in order to maintain order and protect life and property. ... We are committed to integrating community and problem-oriented policing into our daily management principles, policies, procedures, ... [and] resource deployment... . We protect and serve through our core beliefs: ... integrity,... fairness,... and service... .⁶

New Orleanians share the values expressed in NOPD’s mission; they want an effective and efficient professional police department that protects life and property and is committed to serving the community. However, citizens frequently request increased officer presence in their neighborhoods and shorter response times to their calls for assistance.⁷

A police officer’s response to a citizen’s request for assistance may be the only interaction the citizen has with the police. For this reason, it may be the most important measure of a department’s performance based on the citizen’s direct experience. The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) “has conducted police operational and

⁶ New Orleans Police Department, *Policy Manual*, 2012, p. 2.

⁷ See, for instance, Meg Gatto, “Lakeview man says he waited seven hours for NOPD to show up,” *Fox 8 News*, April 14, 2014, accessed April 14, 2014, <http://www.fox8live.com/story/22492014/lakeview-man-says-he-waited-7-hours-for-nopd-to-show-up>; Brendan McCarthy, “Fed-up residents are challenging NOPD on police staffing, response times,” *Times-Picayune*, January 29, 2012, accessed April 14, 2014, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/01/fed-up_residents_are_challengi.html; and WDSU, “NOPD Response Time Criticized after Algiers Slaying,” January 27, 2012, accessed April 14, 2014, <http://www.wdsu.com/NOPD-Response-Time-Criticized-After-Algiers-Slaying/10974638>.

data analyses in 61 cities and towns in 26 states in all regions of the U.S. with populations from 8,000 to more than 800,000.”⁸ ICMA’s 2012 Center for Public Safety Management white paper outlines its methodology, noting that its analysis “focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times,” which “are related almost exclusively to patrol operations.”⁹ The paper further highlights the importance of responding to citizens’ requests for assistance:

Uniformed patrol is considered the backbone of policing. ... Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of department resources. Proper allocation of these resources is critical to having officers readily available to respond to calls for service and to provide law enforcement services to the public.¹⁰

In keeping with NOPD’s mission, adequate staffing of citizen-generated calls for service must serve as the starting point for any police department dedicated to “provid[ing] professional police services to the public.”¹¹

A central question this force structure analysis will address is: does NOPD need additional personnel in order to accomplish these goals? Law enforcement is costly; NOPD accounts for the single largest expenditure of the City’s general funds, and personnel cost constitutes the vast majority of the total. New Orleans officials also project increased law enforcement costs as a result of the current consent decree.¹² For these reasons, residents should carefully evaluate arguments for additional NOPD officers using a sound methodology that measures the demand for

⁸ James McCabe, *An Analysis of Police Department Staffing: How Many Officers Do You Really Need? A review of 62 police agencies analyzed by the ICMA/CPSM* (Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association, Center for Public Safety Management, 2012), 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹ *Ibid.* NOPD must respond to all citizen calls for service; they are a non-discretionary police activity. For this reason, evaluators focused this report on patrol activities and assumed citizen-generated calls for service as the baseline of NOPD’s workload; sufficient officer time must be scheduled to meet the demand.

¹² *United States v. City of New Orleans*, 12-1924, E.D. La., *Complaint*, Doc. No. 1, July 24, 2012, <http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Consent/consent.htm>.

the department's services and calculates the number of officers needed to meet that demand.

Any organization must maintain the necessary force strength and deployment to meet empirically determined staffing demands. Toward that end, healthy organizations require an ongoing intake of personnel to revitalize the force and replenish personnel lost to attrition. New police officers must be hired and trained in order to maintain required staffing levels when individuals are promoted or leave the ranks.

At the same time, individuals should only be promoted when they are needed to fill vacated positions. Otherwise, an organization becomes top heavy, with too many individuals supervising too few employees actively engaged in meeting the organization's service mission. Efficiently managed organizations balance the intake of new personnel with the promotion of existing personnel to meet service demand, maintain a deliberate ratio of rank to file, and accomplish department goals.

Section III of this report examines the New Orleans Police Department's staffing: How many sworn officers and non-sworn personnel are employed in the department? What are their assignments? Evaluators pay particular attention to staffing and deployment in the eight districts and the district platoons responsible for answering calls for service and determine the current number of officers available to provide that service.

Section IV includes an explanation of the four methodologies commonly used for determining the number of sworn officers needed to meet the operational and service needs of a community. Evaluators also describe the workload-based methodology used in this report to determine the number of officers needed to meet service demand.

Section V includes a step-by-step analysis of NOPD's service needs using the workload-based methodology that analyzes citizen calls for service and highlights relevant findings and recommendations. Finally, evaluators provide staffing estimates using the workload-based analysis. Staffing estimates provide information designed to assist NOPD leadership in making policy decisions about the amount of time officers should spend meeting citizens' demand for service and the amount of time that is needed for discretionary and administrative police activities.

In Section VI evaluators make recommendations for increasing the efficient and effective use of personnel resources to meet the demand for service.

The OIG staff was greatly assisted in the preparation of this report by the full cooperation of City employees and officials, especially the men and women who serve in the New Orleans Police Department.

CURRENT NOPD STAFFING AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, SECTION III

Deploying resources efficiently and effectively is a challenge for all law enforcement agencies. The efficient and effective deployment of sworn officers is especially important, because police officers receive extensive and costly training to perform highly specialized duties and functions. Personnel are also the majority of police department expenditures; a typical police organization's personnel costs represent an average of 85 percent of its budget.¹³

Answers to the following questions provide essential information for assessing how a police department deploys its officers:

- Is the department staffed and organized to perform its **mission** to “provide professional police services to the public” by responding to citizen calls for service?
- Do the agency structures support the concepts of (1) **unity of command** (for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander) and (2) **span of control** (the area of activity or number of functions, people, or things for which an individual or organization is responsible)?
- **Are officers' specialized training and expertise maximized?** For instance, what is the mix of sworn and non-sworn personnel? Are sworn officers occupying positions that could be performed more efficiently and effectively by non-sworn personnel?

MANPOWER REPORT

NOPD's Manpower Report is the principal document used to determine staffing. It lists sworn officers and non-sworn personnel assigned to each

¹³ Police Executive Research Forum, *Police Department Budgeting: A Guide for Law Enforcement Chief Executives* (Washington, D.C.: PERF, November 2002), 6, accessed October 30, 2013, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Budgeting/police%20department%20budgeting%20-%20a%20guide%20for%20law%20enforcement%20chief%20executives%202002.pdf.

unit in a department at a given point in time, providing a snapshot of personnel by name, rank, and assignment.¹⁴

Evaluators used a May 2013 Manpower Report to determine the number of NOPD employees and their assignments.¹⁵ The May 2013 Manpower Report showed that NOPD employed a total of 1,485 individuals: 1,215 sworn officers and 270 non-sworn personnel. Sworn officers were 82 percent of NOPD's total personnel.

NOPD'S FIVE BUREAUS

NOPD consists of five bureaus, each directed by the superintendent or a deputy superintendent; the breakdown of personnel by rank for each bureau can be found in the NOPD organization chart.

The 1,215 sworn officers listed in NOPD's May 2013 Manpower Report were assigned to the five NOPD bureaus according to the following percentages:¹⁶

***NOPD
Organization Chart***

***Descriptions of
NOPD Bureau
Functions***

¹⁴ Evaluators examined several NOPD Manpower Reports, which were generally reliable. However, the reports frequently listed personnel who were not available for deployment, overstating the number of officers available for service.

¹⁵ The May 2013 Manpower Report staffing numbers were the most recent numbers available when evaluators conducted the data analyses.

¹⁶ Percentages add up to 101 percent due to rounding. The remainder of the report will focus primarily on the portion of NOPD staff in the Field Operations Bureau that provides direct services to the public through patrols and answering citizen-generated calls for service.

Percentage of Sworn Officers	Number of Sworn Officers	NOPD Bureau
2%	24	Office of the Superintendent
67%	814	Field Operations Bureau
18%	217	Investigations Support Bureau
3%	32	Public Integrity Bureau
11%	128	Management Services Bureau

FIELD OPERATIONS BUREAU

NOPD’s Superintendent stated that “[t]he NOPD commits 70 percent of all sworn positions to patrol and patrol-related duties in the Field Operations Bureau” in his November 2012 budget comments to the City Council.¹⁷ But a closer examination of Field Operations assignments leads to a more nuanced conclusion.

The Field Operations Bureau (FOB) was the largest of the five NOPD Bureaus and included the Reserve Division and Special Operations (Support Services, Homeland Security, Tactical Section, and Traffic). The FOB also included the eight NOPD Districts.

Although the FOB accounted for almost 70 percent of NOPD personnel, the following analysis of manpower in NOPD’s eight districts shows that the actual percentage of the total force answering calls for service or providing direct services to citizens was significantly lower.

NOPD’S EIGHT DISTRICTS

NOPD’s Superintendent told evaluators during an interview that NOPD was a “decentralized department,” with each of the eight districts essentially operating as a stand-alone police department. As a result, NOPD assigned a number of law enforcement functions to the eight districts that police departments in some jurisdictions assign to

¹⁷ Council of the City of New Orleans Budget Hearing, Oral Comments by New Orleans Police Department Superintendent, New Orleans, November, 14, 2012 p. 5.

centralized units. However, all large departments assign patrol functions to geographically defined districts.

Most NOPD districts also had additional specialized units that served the distinct needs of individual districts. For example, each NOPD district had two District Investigative Units, a Task Force, and Narcotics Unit. All of the districts also had Quality of Life officers and Community Outreach Coordinator Sergeants (Co-Cos) who served as a single point of contact for residents and city officials communicating quality of life concerns. Also, “A-Case officers” in each district reviewed police reports for accuracy and completeness. Sworn officers assigned to these specialized units or functions were not assigned to answer calls for service.¹⁸

In May 2013 NOPD assigned a total of 700 sworn officers, approximately 58 percent of all sworn officers, to a wide range of functions within the eight NOPD districts.

DISTRICT PLATOONS

NOPD’s decentralized structure also gave district commanders a great deal of autonomy to control resources, set standards, and assign officers within their individual districts. However, according to the Deputy Superintendent of the Field Operations Bureau, NOPD required all districts to have the same platoon structure.

Every district had three platoons, each corresponding to one of the department’s three shifts.¹⁹ When at full strength, each platoon included a lieutenant who served as shift commander and three sergeants.²⁰ Officers with the Civil Service job titles of Police Officer I – IV in the district platoons served as NOPD’s patrol officers and the primary responders to calls for service.

***NOPD Unit Divisions
by District***

***NOPD District Units:
Functions and
Assignments***

***NOPD District
Platoon Personnel
Assignments***

***Total NOPD Platoon
Staffing by District
and Shift***

¹⁸ For tables with additional descriptive information, see NOPD Unit Divisions by District, and NOPD District Units: Functions and Assignments in Appendix A.

¹⁹ First Day Shift was from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.; Second Day Shift was from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.; Night Watch was from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Officers attended roll call for the 35 minutes before their shifts’ starting times.

²⁰ These numbers can vary due to changes in staffing levels or assignments.

Of the 700 NOPD officers assigned to the eight NOPD districts, 361 officers were assigned to district platoons, approximately 30 percent of the entire police force.

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO ANSWER CALLS FOR SERVICE

Not all 361 officers assigned to district platoons answered calls for service.²¹ The May 2013 Manpower Report staff count for NOPD’s Fourth District platoons provides a representative illustration of platoon deployment in all the districts.²² Figure 1 lists the number of Fourth District officers by rank; 73 sworn officers were assigned to the Fourth District at the time of evaluators’ site visit.

Figure 1. Fourth District Sworn Officers

Rank	Number
Captain	1
Lieutenant	3
Sergeant	13
Police Officer IV	20
Police Officer III	6
Police Officer II	20
Police Officer I	10
Total	73

Based on the Civil Service job classifications of Police Officer I – IV, 56 officers in the Fourth District could be available to answer calls for service. In reality, the total was lower: only 40 (55 percent) of the 73 officers assigned to the Fourth District were assigned to platoons, the units primarily responsible for answering calls for service (Figure 2).

²¹ The May 2013 Manpower Report showed 67 percent of the total force assigned to FOB. Outside of the district platoons, only traffic division officers (part of FOB’s Special Operations Unit), who investigated a small portion of traffic accidents, answered calls for service as part of their assigned duties. Other officers might respond to serious in-progress calls but leave any follow-up work for platoon officers.

²² NOPD Fourth District’s staffing numbers illustrate coverage of the functions and units common to all NOPD districts.

Figure 2. Fourth District Platoon Officers

	Lt	Sgt	Police Officer IV	Police Officer III	Police Officer II	Police Officer I	TOTAL
Platoon A	0	3	3	2	3	2	13
Platoon B	1	3	4	1	2	4	15
Platoon C	1	2	6	0	2	1	12
Combined Total	2	8	13	3	7	7	40

Although 12 to 15 officers were assigned to each of the three platoons, not all of those officers were available to patrol or answer calls for service. Ranking officers and platoon officers assigned to other duties did not routinely patrol or answer calls for service. For example, of the 12 officers assigned to Platoon C, three were supervisors (one lieutenant and two sergeants) who did not regularly respond to calls for service. In addition, one of the Police Officers I – IV from each platoon was assigned as a desk officer. As a result, eight officers provided direct services to citizens, including patrol and answering calls for service during the third shift of the day.


In fact, the Fourth District’s Platoon C might have as few as three officers available to answer calls for service at any point during the day.²³ Several variables could further reduce the number of deployable officers at any given time. For instance, officers might be out on annual or sick leave, attending in-service training, or reassigned due to administrative leave.

Department-wide, 110 of the 361 officers assigned to all NOPD platoons did not answer calls for service: 86 ranking officers were assigned to district platoons and were not assigned to answer calls for service, and an additional 24 officers were assigned to desk duty (one for each of eight district’s three platoons). In sum, NOPD had a total of 251 officers—21 percent of the entire force—assigned to patrol and answering calls for service.

²³ For example, an Orleans Parish Communications District employee participated in a ride-along in the Fourth District and related a scenario in which two cars were patrolling the district. At one point, one car and two officers (including one supervisor) were engaged in a domestic incident for more than two hours, leaving only one car and officer available for calls for service in the Fourth District.

Figure 3 summarizes the number and percentage of NOPD’s total sworn officers who were assigned to the Field Operations Bureau, the eight NOPD districts under the FOB, all district platoons, and answering calls for service.

Figure 3: Number and Percent of Total NOPD Sworn Officers in Field Operations Bureau, Districts, Platoons, and Answering Calls for Service



NOPD PRIORITIES REFLECTED IN OFFICER DEPLOYMENT

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) noted in its 2011 “Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department,” that NOPD’s staffing assignments reflected its “emphasis on arrests and statistics” instead of a priority on answering calls for service and community policing. According to DOJ investigators:

[S]taffing is heavily concentrated into specialized units and task forces, which engage in crime suppression tactics that the Department calls “proactive policing,” as opposed to uniformed patrol platoons, which handle calls for service.²⁴

District commanders reinforced DOJ’s observation in interviews with evaluators. One commander expressed his frustration with the burden of answering calls for service, noting in an interview that he would like to

²⁴ United States Department of Justice, *Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2011), 104, accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf.

see platoons do more of the work the department viewed as “proactive,”²⁵ but they were “bogged down” by calls for service. Another commander noted that he would rather understaff platoons than pull officers from the Task Force or Narcotics units engaged in crime suppression activities.

In contrast, a 2012 International City/County Management Association’s Center for Public Safety Management white paper highlights the importance of responding to citizens’ requests for assistance:

Uniformed patrol is considered the backbone of policing. ... Proper allocation of these resources is critical to having officers readily available to respond to calls for service and to provide law enforcement services to the public.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ McCabe, *An Analysis of Police Department Staffing*, 13.

In the face of increasing costs and shrinking revenues, many communities are struggling to answer the question: How many police officers are required to ensure public safety? Or: How many officers does an agency need to meet the demands placed on it? A community may want—or think it needs—more officers than it can afford. Determining how many officers a community needs effectively frames a discussion about what a community wants and what it can afford.

There are multiple approaches for determining how many officers are needed, “ranging from the simple to the complex, each with a range of advantages, disadvantages, and assumptions.”²⁷

Traditionally, officials and experts determined workforce levels using one of four approaches: per capita, minimum staffing, authorized level, and workload-based. Each approach differs in its assumptions, ease of calculation, usefulness, validity, and efficiency. Understanding the pros and cons of each approach provides context for conducting an evidence-based analysis of police staffing.²⁸

THE PER CAPITA APPROACH²⁹

The *per capita* method compares the number of officers to the population of a jurisdiction. An agency could compare its rate (officers per 10,000 residents, for instance) to that of other jurisdictions or to agencies of a similar size. The agency could then determine if it had more or fewer officers than the average for cities of a similar size.

²⁷ Jeremy M. Wilson and Alexander Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation* (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C., 2012), 3, accessed January 3, 2013, http://a-capp.msu.edu/sites/default/files/files/041218461_Performance_Based_Approach_Police_Staffing_FINAL100112.pdf.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁹ Portions of the descriptions of the four staffing allocation approaches discussed in this report were taken with the authors’ permission from Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach*, 22-28.

The per capita approach can be easily calculated from U.S. Census figures and is easily understood. The disadvantage of this method is that it addresses only the relative quantity of police officers per population and not how officers spend their time; the quality of their efforts; or community conditions, needs, and expectations. Similarly, the per capita approach cannot guide agencies on how to deploy their officers.

Policy-makers and citizens often draw conclusions about a staffing crisis by comparing current numbers to past staffing levels. The effort is inherently selective depending on which years are chosen for comparison and can often be misleading. A police force may appear understaffed if the previous number of officers was higher than the current count. Such conclusions are flawed, because they are based on the unexamined assumption that the department was appropriately staffed in the past.³⁰

***Officer-to-
Population Ratios
in New Orleans,
1990-2012***

Given the disadvantages, experts have advised against using officer-to-population rates for police staffing. The International Association of Chiefs of Police warns, "Ratios, such as officers-per-thousand population, are totally inappropriate as a basis for staffing decisions... . Defining patrol staffing allocation and deployment requirements is a complex endeavor which requires consideration of an extensive series of factors and a sizable body of reliable, current data."³¹

The questions citizens should be asking are: (1) Is the NOPD adequately staffed for the current workload, and (2) are officers being effectively deployed?

THE MINIMUM STAFFING APPROACH

The *minimum staffing* approach requires police supervisors and command staff to estimate a sufficient number of patrol officers who must be deployed at any one time to maintain officer safety and provide an adequate level of protection to the public.

³⁰ McCabe, *An analysis of police department staffing*, 6.

³¹ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Research Center Directorate Perspectives: Police Officer to Population Ratios, Bureau of Justice Statistics Data* (2010) at www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Officer-to-Population-Ratios.pdf.

There are two principal reasons a jurisdiction might use a minimum staffing approach. First, policy-makers could establish a minimum staffing level based on the belief that a minimum number of officers are needed to ensure public safety or the safety of the officers. This may be particularly true in small communities where there are relatively few citizen-generated demands for police service, yet residents expect a minimum number of officers to be on duty at all times.

Second, police officers themselves may insist, often through collective bargaining, that a minimum number of officers be on duty at all times. In some communities the minimum staffing level may be set by ordinance, but that threshold does not reflect actual workload demands.

THE AUTHORIZED LEVEL APPROACH

The *authorized level* approach uses budget allocations to specify a maximum number of officers who may be employed. The authorized level is often driven by resource availability and political decision making. It is not typically based on any identifiable criteria such as demand for service, community expectations, or efficiency analyses.

Unfortunately, the authorized level can become an artificial benchmark for need. If the actual number of officers does not meet the authorized level, it may create the misperception among police leadership, line staff, and the community that the agency is understaffed and overworked.

An agency may be able to meet workforce demand with fewer officers than authorized. Still, the *perception* of being understaffed can diminish morale and productivity and make it appear that the community is not adequately funding public safety even though there has been no analysis of the department's workload.

WORKLOAD-BASED APPROACHES³²

A more comprehensive estimation of appropriate workforce levels considers actual police workload. Staffing indicators are derived from demand for service.

A workload-based approach estimates future staffing needs of police departments by modeling the level of current activity. It requires evaluators to (1) analyze and determine staffing needs systematically based on actual workload demand and (2) account for policy choices regarding service provision and other desired performance outcomes.

Conducting a workload analysis can assist policy-makers with determining the need for additional resources or relocating existing resources (by time and location), assessing individual and group performance and productivity, and detecting trends in workload that may illustrate changing activity levels and conditions. Furthermore, a workload analysis can be performed at every level of the police department and for all key functions, although it is more difficult to assess workload for some units than others.

The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) has recognized the workload-based approach as standard practice for determining appropriate law enforcement agency staffing levels.³³

CORONA SOLUTIONS

NOPD has chosen the workload-based approach. It recently engaged *Corona Solutions* to develop a workload-based allocation and scheduling software system. The Corona system bases its analysis on workload demands, but it does not differentiate between citizen-generated calls for service and discretionary (pro-active) or self-initiated officer activities. Instead, Corona includes all officer activities in its definition of “calls for service.”

³² Portions of the description of the workload-based approach discussed in this report were taken with the authors' permission from Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach*, 22-28.

³³ Commission on Accreditation and Law Enforcement Standards, *CALEA Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies* (Gainesville, VA: CALEA, 2010), Sec. 16.1.2.

The City's <https://data.nola.gov/> website includes pages listing all "911 Calls for Service" for the past three years. This list includes thousands of items that are not citizen-generated, such as traffic stops and warrant service. The computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system records these officer-initiated activities as calls for service in the same way that it records citizen-generated calls for service.

The Corona system also assumes that all officers not officially removed from the Manpower Report are available for deployment, inaccurately inflating the number of deployable officers. For the above reasons, the Corona program may not be reliable "as a tool for optimizing resources."³⁴

THE WORKLOAD-BASED METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS REPORT

The workload-based analysis used in this report excluded self-initiated or discretionary officer activities such as traffic and pedestrian stops, security checks, and preventative or proactive policing. Instead, evaluators examined non-discretionary citizen-generated calls for service as a baseline for determining operational demands.

The model makes it possible to assign differing portions of an officer's time to citizen-generated calls for service and to discretionary activities, such as proactive policing, once the workload baseline for citizen requests for assistance has been determined. Decisions about how much of officers' time should be spent on discretionary activities depends on the department's goals.

STEPS IN THE WORKLOAD-BASED STAFFING ANALYSIS

A step-by-step approach for conducting a workload-based assessment should include the following:

1. Examining the distribution of citizen-generated calls for service by hour, day, and month. Calls for service can differ by the hour of the day, the day of the week, and the month of the year. Knowing

³⁴ Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance Based Approach*, 27.

when peak call times occur can help agencies determine when they must have their highest levels of staff on duty.

2. Examining the nature and prioritization of calls for service. Reviewing the nature of calls can help an agency's leaders understand the work its officers are doing. Types of police work required can vary by area within a single jurisdiction, and some areas might need more staff than others. Understanding the nature of calls for service requires analyzing how calls are prioritized to make sure officers respond in appropriate time and with sufficient manpower.
3. Estimating time consumed on calls for service. Determining how long a call takes, from dispatch to final paperwork, is critical to estimating the minimum number of officers needed for a shift.
4. Calculating the agency shift relief factor. A measure called the shift relief factor shows the relationship between the maximum number of days that an officer can work versus the number of days *actually* worked. It takes into account annual leave, sick time, in-service training, and other factors that reduce the number of days an officer is actually available to work. Knowing the shift relief factor is necessary for estimating the number of officers who should be assigned to a shift so that the appropriate number of officers is working each day.
5. Establishing performance objectives. Department leaders must decide what fraction of an officer's shift should be devoted to citizen-generated calls for service and what portion to other activities. For example, an agency might build a staffing model in which officers spend 30 percent of their shift on citizen-generated calls and 70 percent on administrative and discretionary or proactive activities.
6. Providing staffing estimates. The model uses information developed in the previous five steps to provide estimates of the staff required to meet the calls-for-service demand. Staffing needs will, as noted earlier, vary by time of day, day of week, and month of year, among other variables. Agencies should distribute their officers accordingly. For example, a shift with fewer calls may require fewer officers. These numbers may also vary by the type of calls, and the time and officers they require, in each shift.

WORKLOAD-BASED ANALYSIS OF NOPD, SECTION V

Evaluators performed the six steps in the workload-based analysis and identified opportunities for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of NOPD's data collection, call prioritization, and staff deployment. The six steps are:

1. Examine the distribution of calls for service
2. Examine the types and prioritization of calls for service
3. Determine the time consumed on calls for service
4. Calculate the shift relief factor
5. Decide how much time will be devoted to calls for service
6. Provide staffing estimates

STEP ONE: EXAMINE THE DISTRIBUTION OF CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

Step one in the workload-based analysis is to examine the distribution of citizen-generated calls for service by the hour of the day, the day of the week, and by month to determine high- and low-demand times for staffing.³⁵

The following figure (Figure 4) illustrates the distribution of dispatched calls for service by hour of day. The distribution of calls for service NOPD received is similar to call distribution in many communities.³⁶ Police calls for service are typically at their lowest level about 5 a.m. and then begin to rise to a peak about 5 p.m., when they usually begin a decline. The pace and degree of the decline will depend on the degree of decline in activity during the evening and nighttime hours.

! *1. Examine the distribution of citizen-generated calls for service.*

Determining the number of citizen-generated calls for service.

³⁵ Calls for service usually vary by season; therefore, a workload-based analysis requires a full year of calls for service data and payroll information. For this reason, the calculations that follow are based on 2012 data. The NOPD staffing analyses in Sections III and V of this report were based on a Manpower Report requested in May 2013 so that personnel numbers used in the analysis would represent the most current staffing levels possible. Personnel numbers used for the workload-based analysis will be different from the numbers gleaned from the Manpower Report.

³⁶ Alexander Weiss, *Traverse City Police Workload Analysis* (Chicago: Alexander Weiss Consulting, 2010), 9, accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.alexanderweissconsulting.com/pdf/AWC_TraverseCityFinalReport.pdf.

Figure 4. Average Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service, Distribution by Hour over a 24-hour Period




Figure 5. Average Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service by Day of the Week





Figure 5 depicts calls for service by day of week. Demand was 7 percent greater from Friday through Sunday than from Monday through Thursday.

Figure 6 illustrates calls for service by month. During most months the department handled more than 22,000 calls for service.

Figure 6. Average Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service by Month of the Year



Demand was 9 percent higher from March through August than from September through February.

Police departments in which workload demand based on calls for service varied markedly by day of the week or month of the year would need to make staffing adjustments for those variations. However, for NOPD differences in calls for service workload by day of the week and month of the year were minimal when compared to the variations in some communities. For example, in one Michigan community there were 35 percent fewer calls for service on Sunday than on Friday.³⁷

DISTRIBUTION OF CALLS FOR SERVICE BY NOPD DISTRICT

Figure 7 provides the distribution of calls for service by district. The Fourth District responded to fewer than 24,000 citizen-generated calls for service in 2012, while the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Districts each responded to more than 36,000 calls for service. The remaining districts answered between approximately 30,500 and 33,500 calls for service.

Figure 7 also distinguishes calls for service by priority code. Code Two calls have a higher level of urgency than Code One calls and generally

³⁷ See, for instance, Weiss, *Traverse City Police Workload Analysis*, 11.

require two responding officers, which places a greater staffing demand on the district. For example, the Seventh District responded to almost the same number of calls for service as the Eighth District in 2012; however, the Seventh District responded to more Code Two than Code One calls (in red) while the Eighth District responded to more Code One calls (in red). As a result, Seventh District officers would need more officers to answer calls for service than the Eighth District even though there was little difference in the total number of calls for service.


Figure 7. Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service by Code and NOPD District³⁸

District	Zero	One	Two	ALL
1	567	16,860	13,843	31,270
2	668	15,241	14,726	30,635
3	475	17,455	18,866	36,796
4	399	12,625	10,779	23,803
5	387	16,121	14,425	30,933
6	560	16,555	16,238	33,353
7	370	18,729	19,534	38,633
8	2,710	20,695	15,106	38,511
Unknown	3	149	138	290

The chart below shows the total number of citizen-generated calls for service by district broken down by Code Zero, One and Two.

³⁸ NOPD responds to Code Zero calls for service by phone; the calls did not require an officer to respond to the scene.

Figure 8. Total Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service, By Priority Code and NOPD District



The model takes into account the relative demand placed on the individual districts in the calculation of staffing estimates (Step Six).

STEP TWO: EXAMINE THE TYPES AND PRIORITIZATION OF CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

Reviewing the types and prioritization of calls for service reveals the kind of work an agency’s patrol officers are doing. The nature of the workload demand can provide police departments with valuable insight into methods for reducing workload demand or meeting that demand in different ways.

! *2. Examine the types and prioritization of calls for service.*

Supervisors can determine the nature of the workload demand by calculating the frequency of different types of calls for service. Analyzing how citizen requests for assistance are prioritized provides information about what resources the department must commit when responding. Police work can vary significantly in different geographic areas of a jurisdiction, and agencies can adjust district staffing according to workload demands.

TYPES OF CALLS FOR SERVICE

The three categories in Figure 9 account for 51 percent of calls for service; the remaining 139 call types each accounted for 6 percent or less of total calls.³⁹

*Number and Percent
of Citizen-Generated
Calls for Service by
Type of Call.*

Figure 9. Number and Percent of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service with Highest Percentages, by Type of Call

Type	Count	% of Total Citizen-Generated Calls for Service ⁴⁰
Complaint Other	59,156	22%
Disturbance (Other)	40,837	15%
Burglar Alarm Silent	36,691	14%

FINDING 1. NOPD CLASSIFIED 22 PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE AS “COMPLAINT OTHER,” MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR SUPERVISORS TO USE CALLS-FOR-SERVICE DATA TO INFORM NOPD STAFFING AND DEPLOYMENT NEEDS.

NOPD classified more than 59,000 calls for service in 2012 as “complaint other.” “Complaint other” and “disturbance other” were the two categories with the largest number of calls, comprising fully 37 percent of the total number of calls. The large percentage of calls in these non-specific classifications suggests the categories may have been used as convenient catch-alls, and calls into question the integrity of the data.

“Other” categories do not even appear on the lists of types of calls for service in many communities. For instance, in San Diego, CA the three call categories that had more than 5 percent of the total calls for service were “disturbing the peace,” “prisoner in custody,” and “burglary.” In Lansing, MI, the top four categories were “larceny,” “fight,” “property damage incident,” and “assault.”⁴¹

³⁹ “Number of Citizen-Generated Calls for Service by Type of Call” contains a list of the number and types of calls for all calls for service with 1 percent or more of the total.

⁴⁰ The remaining 139 types of calls for service had 6 percent or less of the total number of calls.

⁴¹ Office of the City Auditor, *Performance Audit of the Police Patrol Operations* (San Diego: Office of the City Auditor), 14, accessed April 4, 2014, <http://www.sandiego.gov/>

NOPD supervisors and city policymakers would be forced to guess about the nature of 37 percent of 2012 calls for service, and basic questions about officers' workload demand based on the frequency and nature of certain types of calls for service could not be answered. As a result, NOPD would not be able to explore options to manage service delivery or alternative methods for citizens to report certain incidents for a large number of its calls for service. NOPD could not determine the true nature of many of its calls due to the overuse of these non-specific categories.

RECOMMENDATION 1. NOPD SHOULD REDUCE ITS USE OF NON-DESCRIPTIVE CALLS-FOR-SERVICE CLASSIFICATIONS AND USE CALL CLASSIFICATIONS THAT PROVIDE QUALITATIVE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF CALLS FOR SERVICE.

When substantial numbers of calls are classified as "other," the data lose their meaning and cannot be used to deploy officers. For example, if NOPD wanted to know about the number and nature of calls at a given location, it could query the data and produce a report that listed the calls. However, if that total included a substantial number of "complaint other" or "disturbance other" calls, NOPD would have less information about the nature of the calls and the types of problems occurring at that particular location.

NOPD could improve its ability to respond to citizens' requests for service and explore options for reducing call-for-service workload demand by limiting its use of "other" categories and using calls-for-service types that provide descriptive information about the type of call. Having more specific information about call types would provide NOPD with more information on where and when officers are needed, and what type of training officers need.

PRIORITIZING CALLS FOR SERVICE

How a department prioritizes its calls for service affects every step involved in answering a call for service. Well-designed priority categories

[auditor/reports/fy14_pdf/audit/14-006_Patrol_Operations.pdf](#); and Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach*, 31. Neither city listed an "other" category in its list of calls with more than 1 percent of the total.

for calls for service provide officers with the information necessary to respond to a call with the appropriate speed and manpower resources.

FINDING 2. NOPD USED THREE MAIN CATEGORIES TO PRIORITIZE CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE, SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITING INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE OFFICER ABOUT THE NATURE AND URGENCY OF THE CALL AND REDUCING THE DEPARTMENT’S ABILITY TO PRIORITIZE RESPONSES TO CALLS FOR SERVICE EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY.

NOPD prioritized 2012 calls for service using Codes Zero, One, or Two.⁴² Code Two calls were urgent and required an immediate response and usually the dispatch of two police officers; Code One calls were non-emergency calls. Code Zero calls accounted for only 2 percent of the total, and were typically handled by desk officers at district stations or by officers assigned to the 911 center.⁴³ Figure 10 lists the number of calls by Code.

Figure 10. Number of 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service by Priority Code

Code	Number of Calls
Zero	6,139
One	134,430
Two	123,655

A limited number of classification categories results in a broader classification scheme that includes a wider range of call types and degrees of urgency in each category. A broad classification scheme also

⁴² Dispatchers categorized calls for service using additional sub-priority codes a-h. Interviews with NOPD officers revealed that they did not use the sub-priority codes when responding to calls.

⁴³ NOPD Policy Manual, Sec. 317, establishes an Alternative Police Response (APR) for “handling low priority calls [for service] via telephone” that is intended to allow “citizens to report issues that do not require a police response at the scene.” Such calls include a call for service that “is not in progress, has not just occurred and is not currently endangering life or property.”

makes less specific information available to the responding officer about the nature and demands of the call.

NOPD's classification scheme resulted in dispatching officers to more than 123,000 citizen-generated Code Two calls in 2012, 47 percent of all citizen calls. The large volume of Code Two calls directly affected the demand on police resources and officers' ability to respond appropriately to each call. The large number of Code 2 calls also suggests they varied significantly in their level of urgency even though they were classified as equally "urgent."⁴⁴ NOPD was limited in its ability to prioritize responses to calls effectively and efficiently without more specific information.

RECOMMENDATION 2. NOPD SHOULD IMPLEMENT CALLS-FOR-SERVICE PRIORITY CODES WITH DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO GUIDE THE OFFICER'S RESPONSE.

There are many different approaches to prioritizing calls that provide greater specificity and more information to the department and responding officers. For example, Kansas City, MO, uses the following prioritization scheme:⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Supervisors had the discretion to redirect manpower as necessary as they received more information about calls for service. Examples of 2012 Code Two calls that did not appear to warrant an "urgent" response included "lost or stolen," "return for additional," and "fireworks."

⁴⁵ Darryl Forté, "Understanding Call Prioritization," *KCPD Chief's Blog*, August 22, 2013 <http://kcpdchief.blogspot.com/2013/08/understanding-call-prioritization.html>.

Priority 10	Assist the officer, send immediately
Priority 11-13	Calls where there is imminent danger to a person's welfare (always lights and sirens on), send immediately
Priority 20	Calls where there is a potential danger to a person's welfare (lights and sirens on if the incident is currently in progress), send within two minutes
Priority 30	Calls where the quality of the police response may be degraded if there is a delay; send within five minutes
Priority 40	Calls where a delay is acceptable
Priority 50	Calls where a delay of up to four hours is acceptable

Adopting a call priority scheme similar to Kansas City's would establish a protocol for officer response and convey the level of danger and sense of urgency. A greater number of discrete, informative call priority codes could also increase NOPD's ability to triage calls effectively when faced with limited resources.

STEP THREE: TIME CONSUMED ON CALLS FOR SERVICE

Determining how long a call takes from initial response to final paperwork is essential for calculating the minimum number of officers needed for a shift.

! *3. Estimate time consumed on calls for service.*

Police calls have four phases: Process, Wait, Travel, and On-Scene.

PROCESS⁴⁶ Process time refers to the time that it takes for (1) the call taker to gather information from the caller and enter the information into the computer-aided dispatch system (CAD), and (2) the dispatcher to see the CAD entry and review the information entered by the call taker, check the priority coding, and send the call out to NOPD officers and stations.⁴⁷ Most 911 centers try to keep processing time below 90 seconds.

WAIT Once the dispatcher creates a call for service, it enters a queue and “waits” there until an officer is available for dispatch. The wait time equals the time the call is in the queue before an officer is dispatched to respond to the call.

TRAVEL Travel time is the time from dispatch, when the officer indicates that s/he is responding to the call, to the arrival of the first unit on the scene.

ON-SCENE On-scene time is defined as the time the first officer arrived on scene until the time the last officer clears. This will vary by the nature of the call, the seriousness of the offense or emergency, and whether or not a report is required.

NOPD WAIT TIME

Wait time is the amount of time it takes the police department to dispatch an officer to answer a call for service after it has been “created” by the call center and enters the “queue.”⁴⁸ The following figure

⁴⁶ Process time, which occurs prior to a patrol officer’s response to a call for service, was not examined in this report. The scope of this evaluation was limited to the time NOPD officers spend on citizen-generated calls for service.

⁴⁷ NOPD call takers answer calls for NOPD, the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD), and Emergency Medical Services (EMS); calls for NOFD and EMS are then transferred to employees of those agencies who take and record the caller’s information.

⁴⁸ Wait time in this context should not be confused with the amount of time a caller waits for an officer to respond to a call for assistance. Wait time does not take into account the process time (the time it takes for Communication Division to record the information from the caller and enter the call into the queue) or the travel time (the time it takes the officer who has been dispatched to a call to travel from where s/he is to the scene). The time that a citizen waits for an officer is referred to as the response time and includes process time, wait time, and travel time.

illustrates wait time (in minutes) by district for Code One and Code Two calls.

Figure 11. 2012 Average District Wait Times
in Minutes by Priority Code


District	Code One	Code Two
1	33.0	4.8
2	36.6	4.3
3	41.0	5.2
4	42.1	5.2
5	41.6	6.1
6	27.1	4.4
7	56.9	7.2
8	28.7	4.5

The table above shows variations in the wait times both by district and by priority code level. The Seventh District had the longest average Code Two wait time, 7.2 minutes, which was 67 percent longer than the Second District's average wait time of 4.3 minutes. For Code One, the longest average wait time was just under 57 minutes, in the Seventh District, more than double the shortest wait time of 27 minutes in the Sixth District.⁴⁹

Evaluators looked for an explanation for the large differences between Code One and Code Two wait times. Graphs comparing the average number of calls created with the average number of calls dispatched by hour of the day suggested why a call could spend time in the queue: a backlog of calls in the queue would result when fewer calls were dispatched than were being created. Figure 12 illustrates how this could occur.

⁴⁹ Neither the available data nor OIG interviews with NOPD officers explained the differences among the district wait times.

Figure 12. Wait Times and Average Number of Created and Dispatched Citizen-Generated Calls for Service in 2012, Distribution by Hour over a 24-hour Period⁵⁰



The bottom half of the graph above shows the distribution of created and dispatched citizen-generated calls for service by hour of the day. The line shows drop-offs in calls dispatched at approximately 6 a.m., 2 p.m., and 10 p.m. (the hour before shift change), and large increases in calls dispatched immediately following shift change at 7 a.m., 3 p.m., and 11 p.m. (when officers on the next shift were deployed).

The top half of the graph shows what was happening to wait times throughout the day: wait times lengthened when calls were held in queue before shift change. The effect was small for Code Two wait times; for Code One wait times, the effect was marked.

Code One wait times doubled between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m., then dropped after 7 a.m. when the next shift was deployed. However, they remained longer than wait times between midnight and 5 a.m. Code One wait times then steadily rose throughout the day until they peaked in the hour before the next shift was deployed at 3 p.m. Between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m., when the night shift came on duty, wait times for Code One calls remained above 40 minutes.

⁵⁰ NOPD staffing was based on three shifts or platoons; shifts began at 7 a.m., 3 p.m., and 11 p.m.

FINDING 3. PLATOON SUPERVISORS HELD CALLS FOR SERVICE IN QUEUE AT SHIFT CHANGE, CREATING A BACKLOG OF CALLS WAITING TO BE DISPATCHED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT SHIFT.

Platoon supervisors provided evaluators with an explanation for the graph’s illustration of the drop-offs in calls dispatched: supervisors held calls for service in queue at the shift change so that officers finishing their shifts could return cars to the station, and the cars could be turned over to officers starting their shifts.

As a result, officers faced a backlog of calls at the start of their shifts. According to the graph, there were only a few points during the day at which officers were dispatched to calls at the same rate that calls were created. The backlog of calls officers faced in the first hour of the shift and the fact that the curves seldom touch suggest that officers rarely caught up to the demand for service.

The following two graphs (Figures 13 and 14) compare calls created and calls dispatched activity for Code Two and Code One calls, separating the number of calls created and the number of calls dispatched for the two priority levels.

Figure 13. Average Number of Code Two Citizen-Generated Calls for Service, Created and Dispatched in 2012, Distribution by Hour over a 24-Hour Period





Figure 14. Average Number of Code One Citizen-Generated Calls for Service, Created and Dispatched in 2012, Distribution by Hour over a 24-Hour Period



The graphs above depicting Code Two and Code One calls separately still indicate drops in calls dispatched at shift change, but fewer Code Two calls were held in the queue than Code One calls. The two lines for calls for service and calls dispatched in the graph of Code Two calls (Figure 13) are contiguous for much of the 24-hour period, indicating that Code Two calls were dispatched more quickly after creation and that officers responded to those calls in a timely manner throughout most of the day.

In contrast, a greater number of Code One calls for service were not dispatched during the hour prior to shift change. The graph shows a sharp dip in calls dispatched in the hour before shift change versus a fairly smooth curve depicting calls created, indicating that few Code One calls coming in during the hour before shift change were dispatched. It also shows a spike in calls dispatched during the first hour of a shift as district officers worked to reduce the number of calls holding in queue.

Holding calls in queue and officers' inability to meet the demand for service had negative consequences for both citizens and officers. It resulted in longer wait times as calls stacked up during the hour before shift change, potentially leading both officers and citizens to perceive an officer shortage as officers tried to catch up with the workload demand.

Platoon officers might play catch-up through their entire shifts as they were dispatched to calls for service holding in the queue even as dispatchers placed additional incoming calls in the queue. The end result: citizens would wait longer for an officer to answer calls for service and officers could feel stretched as they attempted to deal with the backlog of calls for service.

RECOMMENDATION 3. NOPD SHOULD ADJUST PLATOON SHIFT TIMES TO ALLEVIATE THE NEED TO HOLD CALLS FOR SERVICE IN QUEUE; ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO STAGGER THE STARTING AND ENDING TIMES OF SHIFTS FOR SOME OFFICERS.

Scheduling all platoon officers to begin and end shifts at the same time created a managerial problem for supervisors. Calls for service continued to come in, but officers ending their shifts needed to come to the station to check out before officers on the incoming shift could be deployed.

One option to the scheduling problem would be to stagger the beginning and ending times of shifts for a select number of platoon officers. In an interview with evaluators, the Sixth District Commander reported implementing this practice informally; an officer reported for his shift early and returned early to the station at the end of the shift so an officer coming in early for the next shift could cover the shift change period.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the Sixth District also had the shortest average wait time for Code One calls and the second shortest average Code Two wait time (.1 second longer than the shortest average time) of all NOPD districts.

NOPD TRAVEL TIME AND ON-SCENE TIME

Travel time is the time from dispatch until the officer reaches the scene. Guidelines in NOPD's Operations Manual, Chapter 81.1, instruct Communications Division personnel to maintain a complete record of every call, including arrival time; however, the burden remains on officers to notify Communications of their time of arrival at the location specified

in the call for service.⁵¹ Travel time is calculated by subtracting the time of dispatch from the arrival time.

$$\text{Travel Time} = \text{Time of Arrival} - \text{Time of Dispatch}$$

On-scene time is calculated by subtracting the recorded arrival time from the time closed, when the last unit clears from the scene.

$$\text{On-scene Time} = \text{Time Closed} - \text{Arrival Time}$$

FINDING 4. EVALUATORS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE RESPONSE TIMES OR ON-SCENE TIMES, BECAUSE OFFICERS DID NOT ENTER ARRIVAL TIMES FOR 13 PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE.

Evaluators determined that response times, travel times, and on-scene times could not be calculated for citizen-generated calls for service. Officers did not enter arrival times for 33,912, or 13 percent, of the calls, and evaluators were unable to determine if conclusions drawn from the remaining 87 percent of calls for service would be representative of the entire population of calls.⁵² The absence of arrival times also precluded other analyses, such as options for reducing response times by shortening travel times.

Response times are a measure of police performance about which citizens are concerned, and police supervisors and policy makers would have difficulty managing citizens' expectations without reliable response-time data.

RECOMMENDATION 4. NOPD SUPERVISORS SHOULD REQUIRE OFFICERS TO PROVIDE ARRIVAL TIMES WHEN RESPONDING TO CALLS FOR SERVICE.

NODP's Operations Manual, Chapter 81.1, subparagraph 9(h) states that the complaint history "on all requests for police services ... shall contain ... the time of arrival of police units at the scene." NOPD officers should be

⁵¹ New Orleans Police Department, Operations Manual, Chapter 81.1: (9)(h).

⁵² The 13 percent of calls for service for which arrival times were not recorded may be different in some way from the remaining 87 percent; their inclusion could measurably change the average for all citizen-generated calls for service.

instructed to provide the Communications Division with arrival times in compliance with Chapter 81.1.

However, Subparagraph 9 of Chapter 81.1 directs its instructions to the Communications Division; NOPD policy should also specifically state that officers are required to provide arrival times for all calls for service.

TOTAL NOPD OFFICER TIME SPENT ON CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

In New Orleans the average total time an NOPD officer spent on a citizen-generated call for service from dispatch to disposition entry was 45 minutes. Figure 15 illustrates how those times were distributed. Although there were a substantial number of calls that were longer than 40 minutes, 55 percent of all calls were cleared within 30 minutes.

The average total time an officer spends on a call, from dispatch until the last officer clears the scene, is a key factor in estimating staffing levels, step six of the workload-based analysis.

**Figure 16. Number of Hours NOPD Officers
Were Unavailable for Patrol in 2012**

Type of Time Off	Hours Taken
Regular days off ⁵⁴	951,213
Sick ⁵⁵	140,835
J & T Time ⁵⁶	865
Annual Leave	138,005
Training (40 Hours Annually)	42,640
Total Hours Unavailable for Patrol	1,273,559

Computing the Shift Relief Factor:

- **Step One:** Calculate the maximum number of hours an officer could possibly work in a year: 8.58 hours per day X seven days per week X 52 weeks a year = 3,123.12 hours per year.
- **Step Two:** Multiply 3,123.12 hours times the total number of officers who could be deployed to answer calls for service (all PO I – IV) to determine the total number of potential work hours: 3,123.12 X 1,066 = 3,329,246 hours.
- **Step Three:** Calculate the “actual” number of hours worked by subtracting the total time officers were unavailable for patrol in 2012 (from Figure 14 above) from the total time the officers could potentially work: 3,329,246 – 1,273,559 = 2,055,687 hours.
- **Step Four:** Divide the possible hours worked by the actual hours worked to determine the shift relief factor.

$$\frac{\text{Possible Hours Worked}}{3,329,246} \div \frac{\text{Actual Hours Worked}}{2,055,687} = \text{Shift Relief Factor } \mathbf{1.62}$$

In order to fill one position on one shift, NOPD must assign 1.62 officers to that shift.

⁵⁴ Evaluators counted two “regular days off” per week for each officer (8.58 a day X 2 days = 17.16 hours X 52 weeks per year X 1,066 officers = 951,213.12). Every NOPD officer received 40 hours of training annually.

⁵⁵ On average, NOPD officers used 140.5 hours (16 days) of sick leave in 2012.

⁵⁶ When an officer must remain on duty beyond her/his scheduled hours, s/he accrues “J” time. J Time should be used as paid time off within the same pay period and is referred to as “T” time. T time is the actual time taken off and was used to calculate the shift relief factor.

STEP FIVE: DECIDE HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE DEVOTED TO CALLS FOR SERVICE

Decisions about how much time officers will spend on different policing activities are a matter of policy and are often based on performance goals. For example, an agency might build a staffing model in which officers spend 50 percent of their shifts on citizen-generated calls and 50 percent on other patrol activities, such as discretionary or proactive activities, training, and administrative duties.

! *5. Establish performance objectives.*

STEP SIX: PROVIDE STAFFING ESTIMATES

Information developed in the five previous steps was used to determine staffing needs based on workload and performance objectives. Evaluators used analyses of time spent on calls for service to determine the number of officers needed to meet the call demand if each officer spent 100 percent of his time on calls for service, shown in the second column of Figure 17. Evaluators then applied the shift relief factor to determine the actual number of officers needed to meet the calls for service demand at 100 percent time on calls for service, shown in column three.

! *6. Provide Staffing Estimates.*

The staffing model provides recommendations based on yearly averages of calls for service by platoon and district. Figure 17 shows staffing estimates based on 50, 40, and 30 percent of platoon officers' time devoted to citizen-generated calls for service.

Methodology for calculating staffing estimates with expanded table.

The right-hand column in the table shows the number of officers assigned to each platoon according to the May 2013 Manpower Report.

Red numbers in parentheses in Figure 17 indicate the difference between the number of additional officers needed to cover citizen-generated calls for service and the number of officers assigned to platoons in May 2013. The totals listed in red immediately under the table indicate the total number of additional officers needed to meet the demand at 50, 40, and 30 percent time obligated to calls for service.

Figure 17. Platoon Force Needed By NOPD District Based on 2012 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service and a 1.62 Shift Relief Factor

Shift	Officers Required @ 100% of Time on Calls for Service	Officers Required @ 100% of Time on Calls for Service with 1.62 Shift Relief Factor	Officers Required for % of Time Spent Answering Calls for Service and Shift Relief Factor						Officers Assigned to Answer Calls for Service‡
			50%	40%	30%				
1st District									
11pm-7am	2.57	4.16	9	(2)	11	(0)	14	(3)	11
7am-3pm	3.95	6.40	13	(1)	17	(5)	22	(10)	12
3pm-11pm	4.27	6.92	14	(1)	18	(5)	24	(11)	13
2nd District									
11pm-7am	2.30	3.73	8	(1)	10	(1)	13	(4)	9
7am-3pm	3.92	6.35	13	(4)	16	(7)	22	(13)	9
3pm-11pm	4.64	7.52	16	(7)	19	(10)	26	(17)	9
3rd District									
11pm-7am	3.00	4.86	10	(1)	13	(4)	17	(8)	9
7am-3pm	4.89	7.92	16	(8)	20	(12)	27	(19)	8
3pm-11pm	5.42	8.78	18	(8)	23	(13)	30	(20)	10
4th District									
11pm-7am	1.84	2.98	6	(2)	8	(0)	10	(2)	8
7am-3pm	2.83	4.58	10	(1)	12	(3)	16	(7)	9
3pm-11pm	3.60	5.83	12	(2)	15	(5)	20	(10)	10
5th District									
11pm-7am	2.81	4.55	10	(2)	12	(0)	16	(4)	12
7am-3pm	3.42	5.54	12	(1)	14	(1)	19	(6)	13
3pm-11pm	4.58	7.42	15	(2)	19	(6)	25	(12)	13
6th District									
11pm-7am	2.64	4.28	9	(1)	11	(3)	15	(7)	8
7am-3pm	4.20	6.80	14	(3)	18	(7)	23	(12)	11
3pm-11pm	5.10	8.26	17	(6)	21	(10)	28	(17)	11
7th District									
11pm-7am	3.60	5.83	12	(1)	15	(4)	20	(9)	11
7am-3pm	4.70	7.61	16	(2)	20	(6)	26	(12)	14
3pm-11pm	5.70	9.23	19	(2)	24	(7)	31	(14)	17
8th District									
11pm-7am	4.30	6.97	14	(5)	18	(9)	24	(15)	9
7am-3pm	4.20	6.80	14	(6)	18	(10)	23	(15)	8
3pm-11pm	4.40	7.13	15	(8)	18	(11)	24	(17)	7
Additional officers needed to meet demand of citizen-generated calls for service at 50, 40, and 30%			61		139		264		

Red numbers indicate the difference in the number of officers needed to cover citizen-generated calls for service and the number of officers assigned to platoons in May 2013.

‡The number of police officers ranking PO I – IV assigned to each platoon in May 2013 minus one officer assigned as the desk officer for each shift.

FINDING 5. IN MAY 2013 MOST PLATOONS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO MEET THE DEMAND OF CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE AT 50 AND 40 PERCENT TIME ANSWERING CALLS FOR SERVICE; AT 30 PERCENT TIME ANSWERING CALLS FOR SERVICE, NONE OF THE PLATOONS WERE SUFFICIENTLY STAFFED TO MEET THE DEMAND.

The analysis depicted in Figure 17 reveals that, at 50 percent time devoted to answering citizen-generated calls for service, only five of 24 platoons had sufficient staffing to meet the demand; at 40 percent time devoted to calls, only three platoons had sufficient staffing. At 30 percent time obligated to calls for service, none of NOPD's platoons had sufficient manpower to meet the demand for citizen-generated calls for service.

In addition, officers' time spent on citizen calls for service did not include other workload demands, such as police-initiated calls for service, administrative and out-of-service time, and any proactive patrol time. According to an International City/County Management Association white paper, an officer operating at or above 60 percent time on *all workload demands*, has reached "saturation." Operating at or above the saturation index, an officer "begins to shift from a proactive approach ... to a mindset in which he or she continually prepares for the next [call for service]." ⁵⁷

RECOMMENDATION 5. NOPD SHOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO HANDLE CALLS FOR SERVICE WHILE PURSUING OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEMAND.

[W]hen it comes to increasing or decreasing the size of a police department, the managers responsible for these decisions should look first at the quantity and quality of [calls for service] ... as well as how the officers are allocated and deployed in order to meet peak service demands. ⁵⁸

Evaluators examined citizen-generated calls for service to determine the non-discretionary workload demand placed on NOPD. Policy decisions should guide how much time NOPD wants its platoon officers to spend on calls for service and how much time should be available for other patrol

⁵⁷ McCabe, *An analysis of police department staffing*, 2012, 13 and 14.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 12. McCabe used the acronym for "calls for service" (CFS) in his quote, but the words were spelled out in the quote above for the ease of readers.

activities (officer-initiated calls, community and proactive policing, administrative tasks, etc.). However, adequate resources must be assigned to answer the non-negotiable demand of citizens' requests for assistance.

Evaluators based the staffing estimate, along with the associated findings and recommendations, on the number and nature of citizens' calls for service. Based on the analysis, NOPD needed additional manpower to meet the calls for service demand.

However, whether or not the increased numbers needed to answer citizen-generated calls for service requires increased overall manpower is a separate question. NOPD had approximately 1,000 Police Officers I – IV whose job description lists patrol functions, including answering calls for service. How those officers were assigned and deployed was a policy decision made by NOPD managers. Citizens' requests for assistance must be a priority for NOPD, and that priority must be communicated to district commanders.

The following section of this report addresses options for reducing the calls for service demand and increasing the manpower available to answer calls for service at NOPD's current staffing level.

MEETING THE NEED WITH CURRENT RESOURCES, SECTION VI

OPTIONS FOR INCREASING OFFICER AVAILABILITY FOR CALLS FOR SERVICE

Adequately staffing a police department requires managing the demand for service as well as increasing the available supply of officers who can respond.⁵⁹ Evaluators found several ways in which NOPD could use existing resources to increase the number of officers available to answer calls for service.

FINDING 6. NOPD DISTRICTS HAVE SWORN OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO TASKS THAT REDUCE DISTRICTS' CAPACITY TO ANSWER CALLS FOR SERVICE.

NOPD has consistently emphasized the need for additional staffing for the past several years. However, evaluators found several instances in which officers who could be assigned to answer calls for service were assigned to other duties for which their law enforcement training and skills were not essential.

DESK OFFICERS

Each platoon assigned an officer to serve as the desk officer, resulting in a total of 24 platoon officers (three platoons in each of eight districts) who were unavailable to answer calls for service.⁶⁰ Desk officers performed administrative functions for which law enforcement training was not essential; assigning police officers to administrative positions for which law enforcement training was not necessary was an inefficient use of costly resources.

FLEET OFFICERS

One officer in each district served as a fleet officer. These officers spent their shifts repairing police vehicles or providing building maintenance services for district stations. Several commanders noted how much they

⁵⁹ Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance Based Approach*, 59.

⁶⁰ The NOPD shift relief factor is 1.62; to fill one position requires 1.62 officers. For example, the 24 platoon officers assigned as desk officers would require 39 non-sworn staff to fulfill those duties. If the district station maintained limited walk-in hours, however, fewer staff to cover desk duties would be necessary.

valued the work of the fleet officers, who were highly responsive to the building maintenance needs of the district.

Commanders also cautioned that meeting these needs with non-sworn personnel would be difficult and believed they would not have enough functioning police vehicles if they had to rely on the City's fleet maintenance division to make repairs or perform routine vehicle maintenance. However, using a commissioned law enforcement officer for building maintenance, and vehicle repair services is a highly inefficient use of sworn law enforcement personnel.

COMMUNITY COORDINATING SERGEANTS

In 2010 the Superintendent created Community Coordinating (Co-Co) officer positions so city administrators would have a single point of contact for quality-of-life issues. All of the Co-Co officers hold the rank of sergeant and most only supervise one or two Quality of Life officers assigned to a district.⁶¹

Evaluators interviewed members of the legislative and executive branches to determine if the Co-Co sergeants had increased NOPD's accessibility and improved quality-of-life services to the community. Most interviewees said some Quality of Life officers were more responsive to the Council and the Administration after the creation of the new position; however, they perceived no real change in the process of notifying the police about quality-of-life issues or marked improved communication with the police districts.

NOPD's creation of a supervisory position for the purpose of serving as a point of contact for quality-of-life issues raises an additional concern: Co-Co sergeants supervised only one or two Quality of Life officers. From a management perspective, Co-Co sergeants maintained an unusually narrow span of control by managing so few employees. Narrow spans of control result in higher personnel costs, less efficiency, and often reduced accountability.⁶² Whether or not creating the Community Coordinating

⁶¹ City Council staffers described additional activities for the Co-Co sergeants, such as attending community meetings and other outreach activities.

⁶² Troy Lane, "Span of Control for Law Enforcement Agencies," *The Police Chief* 73, no. 10 (October 2006), accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1022&issue_id=102006.

position increased accessibility or service, using a supervisor to manage only one or two employees is an extremely inefficient use of resources.

A-CASE OFFICERS

The A-case officer provided reports and evidence for cases submitted to the District Attorney for review. A-case refers to cases in which the defendant had been arrested and booked with a crime. The A-case officer acted as a liaison with NOPD district officers, reviewing their reports for accuracy and completeness before forwarding them to the District Attorney.

Many of these officers did not hold a supervisory rank over the officers submitting reports, making it difficult for them to hold the reporting officers accountable for inadequate or incomplete reports.

RECOMMENDATION 6. NOPD SHOULD MAXIMIZE ITS CAPACITY TO ANSWER CITIZEN CALLS FOR SERVICE BY ENSURING THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE IS MADE OF TRAINED LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

Best practice suggests that officers currently assigned to desk duties, vehicle maintenance, and building maintenance service should be reassigned to patrol duty, and NOPD should make alternative arrangements for non-law enforcement district needs. The use of increasing numbers of non-sworn personnel in police departments is a national trend; for instance, this past year the Chicago Police Department reassigned 200 desk officers to patrol and increased the number of non-sworn staff.⁶³

⁶³ After an extensive review of the literature, a City of Vancouver Project Team concluded in a 300 page report: "Civilianization is a key feature of best practice police departments." Curt Taylor Griffiths, et al., *Civilianization in the Vancouver Police Department*, (Vancouver, B.C.: City of Vancouver, March 13, 2006), 32, accessed May 8, 2014, <https://vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/studies/vpd-study-civilianization.pdf>. Also, "200 Police Desk Officers To Go On Patrol," CBS2 Chicago, January 31, 2013" accessed March 30, 2014, <http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/01/31/200-police-officers-to-go-on-patrol/>. See also City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, *Opportunities for Civilianization in the Chicago Police Department* (Chicago: Office of Inspector General, January, 2013), accessed March 30, 2014, <http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/IGO-Opportunities-for-Civilianization-within-CPD-Final-1-23-13.pdf>; and City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, *CPD Civilianization Follow-Up*

In addition, supervisors should review case reports as is done in most police departments. Assigning special personnel to a single administrative function is not only inefficient, but when officers are attempting to supervise other officers of equal rank (as is sometimes the situation with A-case officers), it can be ineffective as well.

The efficient and effective use of available sworn officers is particularly critical at the district level, where the analysis showed that staffing shortfalls resulted in long wait times for Code One calls and officers' inability to keep up with the demand of citizen-generated calls for service. A-Case, fleet, and desk officers should be redeployed to increase NOPD's capacity to respond to calls for service.

FINDING 7. A LACK OF CLEAR DEPARTMENT-WIDE EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF SWORN OFFICERS RESULTED IN DIFFERING DEPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES AMONG THE EIGHT NOPD DISTRICTS.

There were significant staffing and deployment differences among the districts; this was particularly true with respect to specialized district units. For example, each NOPD district had one or two District Investigation Units, a Task Force, and Narcotics Units. Figure 18 shows staffing in the Fourth District's specialized units as of May 2013.

(Chicago: Office of Inspector General, December, 2013), accessed March 30, 2014, <http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/uncategorized/cpd-civilianization-follow-up/>. For examples of additional cities: Office of the Independent Budget Analyst Report, *Police Department Sworn and Civilian Staffing Challenges* (San Diego, CA; City of San Diego, May 16, 2012), 7; City of San Jose, Office of the City Auditor *Audit of Civilianization Opportunities in the San Jose Police Department* (San Jose, CA: Office of the City Auditor, January, 2010), accessed April 7, 2014, <http://ca-sanjose.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/3227>.

Figure 18. Fourth District Specialized Unit
Personnel in May 2013

	DIU Staff	DIU Squad One	DIU Squad Two	Task Force	Narcotics	Total
LT	1					1
SGT		1	1	1	1	4
Police Officer	2	4	4	6	6	22
Total	3	5	5	7	7	27

The two squads of investigators worked the first and second day shifts respectively and conducted investigations for all offenses except homicide and sexual assault, which were investigated by detectives in the Investigations Support Bureau.⁶⁴ District Task Forces were street crime units typically assigned to crime hot spots; Narcotics Units conducted street level crime interdiction. Centralized units operating citywide typically handled large-scale narcotics investigations, often collaborating with state and federal agencies.

Evaluators noted differences among the district commanders' flexibility regarding the deployment of Police Officers I – IV assigned to specialized units. Some commanders suggested that they could reassign staff from specialized units to the platoons when a vacancy occurred or high service demand required additional manpower. However, such an action would be taken only as long as the units could meet their other responsibilities.

Most commanders noted that they were required to staff the investigative, task force and narcotics units even at the expense of the platoons. Finally, some commanders thought that it was more effective to keep the proactive units at full strength even if it meant reducing platoon staffing and increasing wait times for non-emergency calls.

NOPD's decentralized structure gave the eight district commanders a large degree of managerial autonomy, allowing them more flexibility to decide how to deploy officers than their counterparts in many other large departments. District commanders had the opportunity to reassign any of

⁶⁴ The Investigations Support Bureau (ISB) is one of NOPD's five bureaus, along with the Office of the Superintendent, Field Operations, Management Services, and Public Integrity.

their personnel with very little notice. Any Police Officer I – IV could be assigned to patrol, including answering calls for service.

RECOMMENDATION 7. NOPD SHOULD PROVIDE GREATER OVERSIGHT AND GUIDANCE ON THE WAY IN WHICH COMMANDERS USE DISTRICT RESOURCES WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT NOPD’S DECENTRALIZED DISTRICT MANAGEMENT.

Responding to citizens’ calls for service is not a discretionary activity: it is highly visible, and NOPD may face consequences if its response to a citizen’s request for assistance falls short of meeting the citizen’s need. District-level command decisions about staffing should align with department and community expectations regarding service delivery, and these policies should be consistently implemented to maximize efficiency and effectiveness.

District commanders appeared to employ inconsistent staffing and deployment policies in the absence of a clear directive about placing a priority on responding to citizens’ requests for assistance. A few district commanders tapped officers in specialized units as needed to augment the number of platoon officers assigned to answer citizen-generated calls for service; others did not. In some districts, commanders stated clearly that responding to citizen’s calls for service was not a priority.

NOPD’s mission is to “provide professional police services to the public,” and NOPD leaders should ensure that district commanders understand that answering citizens’ calls for service is a priority.

USE OF NON-SWORN STAFF

One of the most visible trends in American law enforcement is the increased use of non-sworn or civilian staff to perform a range of duties previously performed by sworn officers.⁶⁵

FINDING 8. NOPD HAD A HIGH RATIO OF SWORN TO NON-SWORN STAFF; MORE THAN 100 OF ITS SWORN POSITIONS MET THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE CRITERIA FOR DUTIES THAT CAN BE PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS.⁶⁶

According to the May 2013 Manpower Report, NOPD employed 1,215 sworn and 270 non-sworn staff. Figure 19 shows the ratio of sworn officers to non-sworn personnel in the five NOPD Bureaus.

Figure 19. Sworn Officers and Non-Sworn Personnel Assigned to NOPD Bureaus in May 2013




Figure 20 shows the results of a City of San Diego survey of large police departments. Its findings suggest that NOPD had a higher ratio of sworn

⁶⁵ San Diego Independent Budget Analyst, *Sworn and Civilian Staffing*, 7; San Jose Office of the City Auditor, *Audit of Civilianization Opportunities*; and Chicago Office of Inspector General, *Opportunities for Civilianization*. See footnote 59 for additional sources.

⁶⁶ The IACP Model Policy on Civilianization is reprinted in San Jose Office of the City Auditor, *Audit of Civilianization Opportunities*, Appendix D.

officers to non-sworn staff than the average for large departments: NOPD had 4.5 sworn officers to every non-sworn staff member.⁶⁷

Figure 20. Comparison of Sworn Officers to Non-Sworn Personnel in Selected Large Municipal Police Departments, 2008

City	Ratio
Denver, Colorado	6.67
Indianapolis, Indiana	5.37
Dallas, Texas	5.15
<i>New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	<i>4.50⁶⁸</i>
Houston, Texas	4.14
San Diego, California	3.46
Los Angeles, California	3.27
Portland, Oregon	3.07
Phoenix, Arizona	2.59
Austin, Texas	2.48
Las Vegas, Nevada	1.60
<i>Average</i>	<i>3.78</i>

Police organizations may resist reclassifying sworn to non-sworn positions for several reasons:

- Historically, police departments used sworn officers to perform almost all jobs, and it can be difficult to overcome resistance to change.
- During times of financial stress local governments often reduce or freeze hiring for non-sworn staff. As a result, agencies must place sworn officers in positions that could be filled by non-sworn personnel.

⁶⁷ San Diego Independent Budget Analyst, *Sworn and Civilian Staffing*, 2012. San Diego surveyed the ratio of sworn officers to non-sworn personnel in nine other large municipal police departments in 2008. (Its 2012 report noted reductions in both sworn officers and non-sworn personnel numbers in the four years since the 2008 survey, but since both sworn officers and non-sworn personnel had experienced reductions, the authors concluded that the ratios would likely not have changed markedly.)

⁶⁸ The average of sworn to non-sworn personnel is the average without the New Orleans ratio, which did not appear in the original chart. Evaluators added the ratio of New Orleans sworn officers to non-sworn personnel (based 2013 NOPD Manpower Report personnel numbers) for purposes of comparison; New Orleans was not referenced in the original report by San Diego's Office of the Independent Budget Analyst titled *Police Department Sworn and Civilian Staffing Challenges*, 2012.

- Having a large percentage of sworn officers protects the agency against budget cuts.
- Police agencies often place officers who are on light duty (or otherwise unable to perform police functions) in jobs that could be performed by non-sworn staff.

Sworn officers should not be assigned to positions that could be performed by non-sworn staff unless the department can make an *affirmative* case as to why doing so makes cost-effective and efficient use of personnel resources.

RECOMMENDATION 8. NOPD SHOULD HIRE MORE NON-SWORN STAFF TO PERFORM NON-LAW ENFORCEMENT DUTIES AND REDEPLOY SWORN OFFICERS TO RESPOND TO CALLS FOR SERVICE.

In general, a position should be sworn only if it requires the powers, skills, and abilities of a police officer (e.g., the authority to make arrests). On occasion, a position may not require the powers, skills, and abilities of a police officer, but using a police officer enhances the position, and the benefits outweigh the costs. Examples could include positions in training and recruiting.

There are several reasons for the national trend to employ more non-sworn staff in police departments when law enforcement training and skills or authority are not required. First, non-sworn staff can often perform tasks performed by a police officer at a significantly lower cost with less training. In 2013 NOPD required recruits to complete six months of Academy training plus four to five months of field training. As a result, each new hire required an extensive financial investment over 10 to 11 months of non-deployable time. Alternatively, non-sworn staff can begin working in their capacity more quickly and with less financial investment and job training.

A second justification for the use of non-sworn staff is that police officers are trained and commissioned to perform a wide range of duties for which they are uniquely qualified, and police departments should make the best use of sworn officers' specialized training and skills: sworn officers should perform those services that only a trained officer is

qualified to perform. For example, even though a police officer might be very good at fixing patrol cars, the City incurs an opportunity cost by using a sworn officer in this capacity.

Finally, civilian employees often bring a better skill set to some tasks than a police officer. For example, individuals with education in forensic science would likely be better equipped to handle evidence at a crime scene than someone without such training.

The San Jose City Auditor's report on increasing civilian staff in the San Jose Police Department cites the International Association of Chiefs of Police *Model Policy on Civilianization*, which identifies responsibilities appropriate for civilian staff. Some of these functions are communications, records, property/evidence, victim advocacy, accident investigation, fleet maintenance, detention, and forensics. The International Association of Chiefs of Police's "discoverpolicing.org" website identifies additional possible civilian positions, including financial and property crime investigators, community outreach, crime prevention, and information technology specialists.⁶⁹

Additional examples:

- The City of Mesa, AZ, uses non-sworn investigators to take initial police reports, lift fingerprints, and collect DNA evidence at crime scenes when perpetrators are not likely to be around and where little to no threat is present.⁷⁰
- The Albuquerque Police Department uses Police Service Aides to conduct traffic accident investigations. The non-sworn members are well trained and have limited enforcement authority. Their compensation is about one half that of a police officer.⁷¹
- The cities of Sacramento, CA, and Orlando, FL, created the non-sworn "Community Service Officer" position. Community Service

⁶⁹ "Discover Policing," International Association of Chiefs of Police, accessed May 19, 2014; http://discoverpolicing.org/whats_like/?fa=civilian_alternatives. The website is part of a nationwide initiative to market the benefits of careers in law enforcement.

⁷⁰ City of Mesa Police Department "Civilian Investigation Specialist: Job Description," accessed March 30, 2014; <http://apps.mesaaz.gov/JobDescriptions/Documents/JobDescriptions/cs4200.pdf>.

⁷¹ City of Albuquerque Police Department, "Requirements: Police Service Aide," accessed April 4, 2014, <http://www.apdonline.com/requirements/aide.html>.

Officers handle “lower priority calls which do not require an armed police officer with arrest powers.”⁷²

- Beginning in 2011, San Francisco, CA, implemented a pilot program in which civilian investigators responded to nonviolent crimes such as burglaries or car break-ins. Civilian investigators did not respond to crimes in progress, and civilians could schedule appointments over the phone. Investigators interviewed victims and witnesses, took photos of the crime scene, collected fingerprint and DNA evidence, and wrote reports.⁷³

Evaluators identified a number of NOPD positions currently performed by sworn officers that could be performed by non-sworn staff, listed below by bureau.⁷⁴ State law or city ordinance mandates that sworn NOPD officers fill some of these positions, such as providing security at Municipal, Traffic, and Juvenile Courts. The City should work with legislators to amend statutes and ordinances to permit alternatives to having officers serve in these capacities. Also, some of the positions identified below are sergeants and lieutenants. When these positions become vacant through attrition—officers resign or retire—NOPD should consider whether their replacements could be filled by non-sworn employees.⁷⁵

⁷² City of Sacramento Police Department, “Patrol Services Bureau,” accessed April 4, 2014, <http://www.cityoforlando.net/police/patrol-services-bureau/>.

⁷³ John Cote, “Civilians take on police work in SFPD program,” *SF Gate*, July 25, 2012, accessed April 4, 2014, <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Civilians-take-on-police-work-in-SFPD-program-3180624.php>; and National Public Radio, “San Francisco PD Tries Out Civilian Investigators,” August 2, 2010, accessed April 4, 2014, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128923342>.

⁷⁴ This is not an inclusive list; NOPD also presented 22 positions to the New Orleans City Council in November 2013 that could be filled by non-sworn staff. NOPD provided its list of 22 positions by rank and salary. It is unclear whether any of these positions were also identified by evaluators in Figure 21.

⁷⁵ Hiring additional non-sworn personnel would require an initial expense, but hiring non-sworn personnel would be less costly than hiring additional recruits, for which the City has already allocated funds. For example, the Office of Inspector General in Chicago found that the average salary of a sworn officer was 37 percent higher than that of the average civilian in the Chicago Police Department. Hiring non-sworn personnel would also prove less costly in the long run; when non-salary compensation and fringe benefits such as pensions were taken into account, a Chicago police officer cost 62 percent more than a civilian. Chicago Office of Inspector General, *Opportunities for Civilianization*, 2013. The City of San Jose also calculated marked cost savings: City of San Jose, *Audit of Civilianization Opportunities*.

Figure 21. NOPD Sworn Positions That Could Be Non-Sworn,
May 2013 Manpower Report⁷⁶

Bureau	Unit	Position	Number
Field Operations	NOPD Districts	Desk Officer	24
	NOPD Districts	A-case officer	8
	NOPD Districts	Fleet officer	8
	Communications	Sergeant	1
	Communications	Police Officer	2
	Investigations	SID Building Security	Police Officer
SID Sanitation		Police Officer	1
CID Domestic Violence		Sergeant	1
CID Domestic Violence		Police Officer	4
CID Juvenile		Lieutenant	1
CID Juvenile		Sergeant	3
CID Juvenile		Police Officer	9
ISB Crime Lab		Sergeant	3
ISB Crime Lab		Police Officer	9
ISB Central Evidence		Police Officer	9
Management Services		Public Records	Lieutenant
	Public Records	Sergeant	1
	Public Records	Police Officer	4
	Fleet	Sergeant	1
	Fleet	Police Officer	3
	Support Services	Police Officer	4
Total			102

NOPD may prefer to have sworn officers fulfill many of these duties, but there are reasons why non-sworn personnel should be used when specific law enforcement skills and training are not needed.

- It is a strain on district platoon staffing to assign police officers to the station desk: non-sworn personnel could staff these positions. If the physical security of the station is considered an impediment, less expensive solutions include: (1) making architectural changes to the space to ensure greater safety; or (2) establishing walk-in hours that limit access to the station to certain hours of the day.

⁷⁶ For purposes of this evaluation, evaluators determined that a position could be filled by non-sworn personnel if the position's duties did not require law enforcement powers, skills, or training, including arrest powers or the supervision of individuals whose duties included making arrests. See City of San Jose, *Audit of Civilianization Opportunities*, 36.

- NOPD has struggled to maintain a fleet of police vehicles for service delivery. In part its response has been to assign sworn officers to maintain the vehicles. However, this is a highly inefficient use of law enforcement resources, and NOPD should consider other options for providing this necessary service.
- The Investigative Support Bureau Domestic Violence and Juvenile units did not actually investigate offenses; the investigations were handled at the district level. Sworn officers working in the Juvenile unit served an administrative function, processing intake and booking juvenile detainees after a custodial arrest. Non-sworn professionals could perform the administrative duties of the centralized Domestic Violence and Juvenile Units, perhaps even providing additional services beyond the administrative functions of the position.
- A sergeant or lieutenant supervised non-sworn members of the department in several units. In most cases a non-sworn supervisor could manage these units. For example, the Risk Management and Accounting, Public Records, Communications, and Central Evidence units could all be supervised by non-sworn personnel.

WIDENING THE SPAN OF CONTROL

One of the keys issues in police organization and strategy is span of control, or the number of subordinates each supervisor directs. When determining the appropriate ratio of supervisors to subordinates the agency should incorporate criteria such as: complexity and quality of work; the skills and experience of supervisors and employees; administrative requirements; the degree the workforce is dispersed; and the stability of the organization.

FINDING 9. NOPD HAD A HIGHER RATIO OF SERGEANTS TO OFFICERS THAN THE RECOMMENDED AVERAGE.

Of NOPD's 1,215 sworn staff, 298 (25 percent) held the rank of sergeant or higher, an average of one supervisor for every four police officers.

Figure 22: Ratios of NOPD Sworn Officers to Supervisors

3.1 Lieutenants : 1 Captain
3.3 Sergeants : 1 Lieutenant
4.3 Police Officers : 1 Sergeant

These data indicate that NOPD's captains, lieutenants, and sergeants had a narrow span of control. The ratio of staff to supervisors was considerably lower than the ratio recommended by the Police Executive Research Forum; which recommends a ratio of seven to eight officers to one sergeant.⁷⁷

NOPD's low span of control was due to the following factors:

- NOPD assigned sergeants to direct relatively small workgroups. For example, the Traffic Section's Fatality Unit (four police officers) and Hit and Run Unit (three police officers) each had a sergeant assigned. Also, as described earlier, in each of the eight districts one sergeant was assigned to supervise two Quality of Life officers.
- A lieutenant and three sergeants staffed each patrol platoon, generally supervising between 10 and 15 police officers.⁷⁸
- Sergeants often supervised workgroups consisting largely of non-sworn staff.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Police Executive Research Forum, *Organizational Assessment of the San Francisco Police Department: A Technical Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, December, 2008), 14. PERF noted that the officer-to-supervisor ratio may need to be lower than eight to one in some circumstances.

⁷⁸ According to NOPD personnel, the purpose of this staffing structure was to have two supervisors on duty on each shift. However, assigning four supervisors to a single platoon may result in an inefficient command structure.

⁷⁹ Examples include the Crime Lab and the Communications Division.

RECOMMENDATION 9. NOPD SHOULD WIDEN THE SPAN OF CONTROL AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS AND COMMAND OFFICERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH BEST PRACTICE AND OPERATIONAL NEEDS.

The Police Chief published the results of a 2006 survey of spans of control in police departments nationally.⁸⁰ The widest supervisor-to-officer span of control among responding large departments was one to fifteen, while the average for all departments was one supervisor for every seven officers. These results were consistent with an earlier widely cited study that reported a nationwide average of one supervisor for every 8.4 officers; among departments with a strong emphasis on community policing the ratio was slightly lower, 7.7 officers per supervisor.⁸¹

Although the appropriate span of control in a police organization may vary to some degree, the “possible financial saving with little perceived increased risk is attractive” to managers searching for cost savings. In conclusion, both national patterns and recommended practices suggest NOPD supervisors could direct a larger number of employees.⁸²

⁸⁰ Lane, “Span of Control.” The average cited was based on 141 responding agencies.

⁸¹ Both Lane, “Span of Control” and City of Glendale Police Department, *Staffing Study 2008* (Glendale, CA: Glendale Police Department, 2008), among others, cite Stavros S. Anthony, “The Structural Dimensions of Community Oriented Police Departments” (PhD diss., University of Nevada, 1999). The City of Glendale Police Department had a ratio of one supervisor to 10 officers for first-line supervisors of patrols.

⁸² Lane, “Span of Control.” See also, Seattle Police Department Memorandum, December 2013, from the Seattle Assistant Chief of Police to the Seattle PD Consent Decree Compliance Coordinator, Subject: Span of Control/Unity of Command/Acting Sergeants, accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.seattle.gov/police/compliance/docs/Span_Of_Control_Unity_Command_Sergeants.pdf. Seattle Police Department’s (SDP) Assistant Chief of Police reported that SDP’s span of control for 911 responders was one supervisor to 7.5 officers, which the Asst. Chief characterized as a “high supervisory level for a major police department.” SPD is currently reevaluating its span of control, conducting an in-depth analysis of the following factors: size of patrol; deployment structure; officer distribution; supervisor workload (including use of force, biased policing, and early intervention); and task complexity (including supervisory duties and workload trends by squad, unit or section).

OPTIONS FOR REDUCING DEMAND THE DEMAND FOR SERVICE

Besides increasing the use of non-sworn personnel, a second option for increasing the staff available to meet a department's performance objectives is to reduce the call-for-service demand. There are two ways to accomplish this: (1) reduce the number of calls for service, and/or (2) assign individuals other than officers to respond when the skills of trained law enforcement personnel are not required. Numerous departments nationwide have reduced the demand for police response to false burglar alarms and minor traffic accidents using these approaches.

REDUCING CALLS FOR SERVICE DUE TO FALSE BURGLAR ALARMS

Police departments across the country respond to millions of false alarms annually at a cost of well over \$1 billion. On a national basis, "solving the problem of false alarms would by itself relieve 35,000 officers from providing an essentially private service."⁸³

Moreover, an alarm signal is NOT an indicator of a criminal activity; in most instances, it is designed to detect motion, including "human error, system malfunctions and abnormal conditions, most of which have little to do with crime."⁸⁴ Police departments and the municipalities that finance their needed services can realize significant savings and increase productivity by reducing this often unproductive use of officers' time.

FINDING 10. IN 2012 A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF NOPD RESOURCES WERE WASTED RESPONDING TO 36,691 BURGLAR ALARMS.

NOPD responded to more than 36,000 burglar alarms in 2012, 14 percent of all citizen-generated calls for service. "Burglar alarm silent" was the third largest calls-for-service category. Nationally, the vast majority of

**Number of 2012
Citizen-Generated
Calls for Service by
Type of Call**

⁸³ Rana Sampson, *False Burglar Alarms, Problem Oriented Guides for Police Series No. 5* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Office, 2002), 1, accessed March 22, 2014, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e05021556.pdf>.

⁸⁴ "Verified Response Really Does Work," November, 2004, 2, accessed February 26, 2014, http://slcpd.com/c0ntent/uploads/multiple_cities_endorse_VR.pdf. "Verified Response" is a guide published by the following police departments: Las Vegas Metro; Salt Lake City, Utah; Arvada, CO; Salem, OR; West Valley City, Utah; Broomfield, CO; Lakewood, CO; Westminster, CO; South Salt Lake, Utah.

burglar alarms are false; a recent study by the Urban Institute describes the nature of this problem:

Most false alarms come from residential and commercial security systems In cities for which we have data, 90 to 99 percent [of burglar alarms] are false.⁸⁵

False alarms are a wasteful use of police resources and a problem that many law enforcement agencies struggle to manage.

RECOMMENDATION 10. THE CITY SHOULD MAKE REVISIONS TO CITY CODE DESIGNED TO REDUCE CALLS FOR SERVICE DUE TO BURGLAR ALARMS; NOPD SHOULD ADOPT A NEW POLICY AND PROCEDURE THAT REFLECTS THOSE CHANGES.

NOPD should adopt a new policy and procedure for responding to alarms. In addition, the City should amend City Code Sec. 27-8, which outlines the City's current regulations designed to reduce police response to false alarms. The ordinance has not been enforced, in part due to its unpersuasively lenient penalties for non-compliance and the fact that the responsibility for the enforcement of violations was placed on an "alarm administration section" of the NOPD.⁸⁶ Also, the collector of fines was unspecified: the ordinance named three or more possible entities for the task.⁸⁷

The Dallas Police Department concluded in 2005 that "attempts to manage false alarms with warnings, fines and permits" had limited effectiveness, required an investment of personnel and administrative

⁸⁵ Phil Shaenman, Aaron Horvath, and Harry Hatry, *Opportunities for Police Cost Savings without Sacrificing Service Quality: Reducing False Alarms* (Urban Institute: Washington, D.C., November 2012): 1, accessed February 5, 2014, <http://www.urban.org/publications/412729.html>.

⁸⁶ A 2012 Manpower Report listed one officer staffing the "Alarm Reduction Section," a division of the Specialized Support Services division of the Special Operations Division, Field Operations Bureau, but by May 2013, the division did not appear in the Manpower Report. However, it still appears in the NOPD organization chart.

⁸⁷ City Code Sec. 27-8 (d), states: "Except for the fines collected by the municipal court, it shall be the responsibility of the finance department or the false alarm administration section of the police department or a designated collection agency or agencies to collect such fines"

resources, and were not “in the interest of public safety.”⁸⁸ For these reasons and in response to state law, the Dallas Police Department endorsed the “verified response” approach. The verified response approach requires alarm companies to verify that a crime occurred or was in process visually using their own resources or a private guard company.

Similarly, the Milwaukee Police Department implemented its Verified Response Policy for burglar alarms in September 2004. Under its policy the Milwaukee Police Department responded to the report of a burglar alarm activation only after verification by a private first responder service.⁸⁹ Milwaukee reduced the number of calls for service due to alarms from more than 30,000 prior to the new policy, to 620 in 2012 as a result of its policy change.

Other cities have responded with approaches that rely on registering alarm companies and regulating the behavior of users and alarm companies through monetary penalties and education. These approaches include one or more of the following:

- Licensing and registration of alarm companies and users;
- Implementing graduated fines and sanctions (up to and including not responding) for repeat false alarms;
- Requiring more sophisticated alarm equipment; and/or
- Educating users.

These suggestions have been implemented successfully in other major cities. Prior to implementation of its False Alarm Program, the Seattle

⁸⁸ Dallas Police Department, “Verified Alarm Response: Discussion Document,” August 16, 2005, accessed March 3, 2014, http://dallascityhall.com/committee_briefings/briefings/Verified_Alarm-PSHS-081605.pdf.

⁸⁹ Milwaukee Police Department Burglar Alarm Information Page, City of Milwaukee, accessed February 26, 2014, <http://city.milwaukee.gov/Police/BurglarAlarmPolicy.htm>, and Tim Keller, *Security Alarm Response: The Benefits of Privatization* (Parsippany, NJ: Securitas Security Services, 2014, accessed May 8, 2014, <http://www.securitas.com/Global/United%20States/The%20Alarming%20Gap%20in%20Security%20Alarm%20Response%20.pdf>. A private first responder is a security service or guard company contracted by the alarm company to respond to burglar alarm activation. Prior to the Verified Response Policy adoption, the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) responded to over 30,000 burglar alarms per year, 97 percent of which were false. In 2012 MPD responded to approximately 620 burglar alarms, only 38 percent of which were false.

Police Department responded to an average of 25,000 alarm calls per year, more than 97 percent of which were false. The city responded by adopting an ordinance in 2004 that imposed heavy fines for false alarms. The Seattle Police Department responds to fewer than 11,000 false alarm calls a year since implementing its program. Even with this reduction, responding to false alarms costs the City of Seattle in excess of \$1 million annually.⁹⁰

ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO MINOR TRAFFIC INCIDENTS

Police departments use valuable time and resources when responding to minor traffic accidents without injury, when damage is minor, and vehicles are drivable. Numerous jurisdictions deem minor accidents as a civil matter between the involved parties and have taken steps to relieve law enforcement officers from the time-consuming task of taking a report on a non-criminal matter.

FINDING 11. NOPD PATROL OFFICERS SPENT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME INVESTIGATING TRAFFIC INCIDENTS THAT DID NOT REQUIRE THE TRAINING AND EXPERTISE OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER.

Traffic accidents and hit and run calls for service numbered 18,475, or 7 percent of all citizen-generated calls for service. Traffic accident investigation is a labor-intensive activity, and district commanders spoke about the significant demand that accidents placed on platoon resources.

Traffic accidents were particularly problematic for NOPD, because unlike many Louisiana jurisdictions, the department investigated crashes on the interstate system. Interstate crashes expose citizens awaiting a police response to the dangers of the highway environment, and require two or more officers to control and detour traffic at the accident site and conduct the investigation.

*Number and
Percent of 2012
Citizen-Generated
Calls for Service by
Type of Call.*

⁹⁰ Seattle Police Department, "False Alarm Program," accessed on February 26, 2014, <http://www.seattle.gov/police/programs/alarms/>. The City of Seattle bills the alarm companies directly; companies are required to be licensed and use enhanced call verification prior to requesting police dispatch. The SPD saw a 45 percent reduction in the monthly average dispatched calls between 2002 and 2010.

RECOMMENDATION 11. THE CITY SHOULD INCLUDE IN ITS STATE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA CHANGES TO STATE LAW THAT PERMIT ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND RESULT IN THE MOST EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE USE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES; NOPD SHOULD ADOPT NEW POLICY AND PROCEDURE TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES.

Several alternative approaches to the current practices of NOPD are used successfully in other jurisdictions. Columbia, MO, surveyed benchmark municipalities in the United States and discovered a range of possible responses. Representative of the responses was Kansas City, MO's "alternative handling" protocol, in which citizens file walk-in reports and telephone reports without initiating a police response.

Chicago's citizens come to the station within one day of the accident to file a report. Mountain View, CA, implemented a policy by which citizens complete an online "Internet Report" or submit an in-person "Counter Report Form" available at district police stations.⁹¹ Alternative procedures used by other jurisdictions:

- The City should reduce the number of accidents requiring a police investigation by working with state legislators to raise the dollar threshold for damages resulting from the accident. (The current threshold in Louisiana is \$500, which would likely include most crashes).⁹²
- Direct citizens involved in minor crashes (without injury and when vehicles are drivable) to report the crash online using a web form available at the NOPD website, or at a police district, either immediately following the accident, within 24 hours, or upon scheduling an appointment.
- Use non-sworn police accident investigators to respond to citizen calls for assistance and take police reports for accidents without

⁹¹ City of Mountain View, "Traffic," accessed February 26, 2014, http://www.mountainview.gov/city_hall/police/traffic/.

⁹² La. R.S. 32:398(A)(1) and (D). Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:398 requires local law enforcement agencies to investigate all accidents resulting in property damage in excess of \$500. There is no requirement for officers to investigate at the scene of the accident.

injury. Several cities, including Albuquerque, NM, and Orlando, FL, use this method.

- Request Louisiana State Police to patrol interstate highways in New Orleans. NOPD officers spend many hours responding to interstate traffic accidents in New Orleans, a major city with miles of interstate highway within its boundaries.⁹³ Many cities, including numerous cities in Louisiana, collaboratively share services with the State Police.

⁹³ This burden is especially great for districts responsible for responding to accidents on the I-10, especially the Seventh District, which covers the I-10 between 510 and the high rise in New Orleans East. Traffic accidents on the freeway require at least two responding units, sometimes as many as four.

If the answer to our problems is more staffing, we'll always be understaffed.

—Police department focus group participant⁹⁴

The police officer quoted above acknowledged the seductive answer to most police staffing problems: hire more staff. But when it comes to “increasing or decreasing the size of a police department, the managers responsible for these decisions should look first at ... how the officers are allocated and deployed” to meet workload demands, the starting point for which is calls for service.⁹⁵

Answering citizens' requests for police assistance is a non-discretionary police activity. Officers cannot choose who calls, for what reason, or when emergent situations occur. They also have limited control over how much time they must spend to perform the service required. Calculating the mandatory citizen-generated calls for service workload is the first step in assessing whether or not a police force is sufficiently staffed to meet the demands citizens place on it.

The workload-based analysis of NOPD's citizen-generated calls for service revealed a demand for service that was not being met. Officers struggled to respond to requests for assistance throughout most of each day's three shifts. NOPD met the demand for more urgent Code Two calls with better success, but the large number of Code Two calls—almost half of total calls for service—meant that officers had limited ability to triage calls for service effectively. Also, citizens making calls classified as lower priority could wait a long time for a police response.

Answering calls for service was a low priority for NOPD. When asked what portion of an officers' time should be devoted to calls for service, NOPD's Superintendent responded that dispatch was included in the 60 percent of officers' time devoted to discretionary proactive policing (e.g.,

⁹⁴ Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach*, 14.

⁹⁵ McCabe, *An analysis of police department staffing*, 12. The ICMA methodology starts with calls for service as the baseline and then considers “other operational demands” facing the department. The methodology used in this report includes the other operational demands in the portion of time not devoted to answering citizen calls for service.

traffic stops and warrant service) and all administrative tasks (including court appearances, report writing, and training).⁹⁶

In addition, although 58 percent of NOPD's sworn officers were assigned to the eight districts, only 21 percent of NOPD sworn officers were assigned to the platoons responsible for responding to calls for service. Finally, according to DOJ observations, more than one commander commented on the burden of calls for service in a department that placed a higher value on proactive policing focused on crime prevention.

Residents' belief that NOPD is understaffed is nourished by the small number of officers answering calls for service, officers' lack of visibility in many neighborhoods, and the extended time that citizens can wait for a police response. Officers assigned to answer calls for service surely feel the strain; the data indicate they had little time for activities other than striving to meet the calls for service workload demand. The empirical evidence confirms the anecdotal evidence: NOPD does not have enough officers assigned to platoons and answering calls for service.

However, alleviating the shortage of officers answering calls for service does not necessarily mean that the department needs additional force strength. NOPD has complete control over how the organization is structured and how officers are deployed, and its leaders can make immediate policy decisions to address the shortage of officers responding to calls for service.

This analysis revealed several ways in which NOPD can make more efficient use of existing manpower resources, including:

1. Shifting non-law enforcement burdens currently borne by sworn officers to non-sworn personnel;

⁹⁶ NOPD Superintendent e-mail message to evaluators, February 27, 2014. The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) defines proactive policing as public-initiated calls for service, police-initiated calls for service, administrative and out-of-service time, directed patrol, community policing, and selected traffic enforcement. McCabe, *An analysis of police department staffing*, 10; and ICMA, "Determining Police Staffing & Deployment," (Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association, Center for Public Safety Management), pdf accessed on-line at ICMA website April 8, 2014, <http://icma.org/en/Search?s=An%2Banalysis%2Bof%2Bpolice%2Bdepartment%2Bstaffing>.

2. Widening the span of control to increase the number of officers available to perform direct citizen services and reducing the costs and inefficiencies of a top-heavy organization; and
3. Revising some policies and/or legal requirements to improve the efficient provision of necessary law enforcement services. The examples given above include legislative changes designed to reduce calls for service due to false alarms and minor traffic accidents.

In addition, NOPD can better inform its management decisions by assigning calls for service to classifications that provide specific information about both the nature of the call (minimizing the use of “other” categories) and the actions required of the officer regarding the call’s disposition (reducing use of the uninformative “necessary action taken” disposition).⁹⁷

Hiring and training additional police officers is the most expensive solution to NOPD's manpower needs. Every agency needs additional new staff to replace individuals lost to attrition, retirement, or promotion. The ranks of NOPD’s Police Officers I – IV, the officers who provide direct citizen services by answering calls for service, need to be replenished periodically.

However, NOPD's high ratio of supervisors to officers suggests that it has promoted large numbers of individuals without a clear need for additional supervisory personnel. Promotions should only result from vacancies in rank in order to maintain cost-effective spans of control and to preserve the number of officers necessary to respond to calls for service. NOPD should rectify this imbalance.

The deployment of large numbers of officers in specialized units at the district level reduced the number of officers available to fulfill the departmental obligation to answer calls for service and came at a high cost to NOPD's ability to respond to citizens' needs. And giving commanders almost complete autonomy to deploy officers at the district level, divorced from a strong directive to prioritize response to citizens'

⁹⁷ The majority of citizen-generated calls for service (52 percent) resulted in a disposition of “necessary action taken” (NAT). NAT indicates the calls were handled on the scene and required no follow-up activity or reports by the officer.

request for assistance, meant that those requests would be a low priority.

NOPD leaders have cited the attrition rate and NOPD's diminished force strength compared to previous years as evidence of the need for additional officers. But increasing NOPD's overall force strength will not ensure that citizens' service needs will be met; the findings in this report suggest that changes in the structure and deployment of police personnel may be more effective and efficient, and less costly, means of meeting the department's current workload.

CONSULTANTS' BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. Alexander Weiss has over 30 years of experience as a public safety practitioner, researcher, trainer, and consultant. He directed the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety and was Professor of Management and Strategy at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern. He is currently an adjunct professor of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University.

Prior to his appointment at Northwestern, Dr. Weiss was a member of the faculty of the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University, Bloomington and served as a senior adviser to the Indianapolis Police Department. He has 12 years of experience with law enforcement agencies in Colorado; while at the Colorado Springs Police Department, he served as field supervisor and directed the newly created operations analysis unit.

Dr. Weiss has written and lectured widely on topics such as resource allocation and work scheduling, police innovation, highway safety, program evaluation, and racial profiling. He has consulted for the National Institute of Justice, the National Research Council, and the U.S. Law Enforcement Executive Program of the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police.

Dr. Weiss has conducted patrol staffing analyses for communities of all sizes, including Cook County, IL Sheriff; Indianapolis, IN Police; Chicago, IL Police; Lansing, MI Police; Evanston, IL Police; Delaware, OH Police; Holland, MI Police, and Peoria, IL Police.

Dr. Weiss holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of Colorado and a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University.

Dr. Weiss was assisted in this study by **Dr. Jeremy M. Wilson**, the Associate Director for Research and Associate Professor of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, where he founded and

directs MSU's Program on Police Consolidation and Shared Services. He also served as a Behavioral Scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he was founding Associate Director of the Center on Quality Policing and Founding Director of the Police Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse.

Dr. Wilson has conducted ground-breaking research regarding police staffing allocation and deployment, career progression, recruitment, retention, personnel cohorts and management implications, and efficiency. Dr. Wilson participated in RAND's police staffing study of the NOPD designed to stabilize the New Orleans police force after Hurricane Katrina.

Dr. Weiss and Dr. Wilson co-authored *A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation, 2012*, a project sponsored by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office, U.S. Department of Justice.

NOPD BUREAUS: DESCRIPTIONS AND FUNCTIONS⁹⁸

Office of the Superintendent	The Office of the Superintendent consists of (1) the Inspections Division, responsible for monitoring compliance with departmental regulations and conducting performance inspections and evaluations, (2) the Public Affairs Office, which serves as the official department spokesperson, and (3) the Technology Division (crime analysis, mobile data, and data entry/crime statistics).
Investigations Support Bureau	ISB conducts follow-up investigations of crimes committed against persons or property that require a degree of specialization or a centralized investigative approach. The Bureau includes three Divisions: crime lab and evidence, specialized investigations, and the criminal investigative division.
Public Integrity Bureau	PIB monitors the performance of individual police officers and directs investigations into citizen and NOPD-initiated allegations of police misconduct.
Management Services Bureau	MSB provides NOPD with administrative and support services, including budget preparation and monitoring, preservation and monitoring of criminal records, human resources, recruitment, education and training, grants management, and facility and fleet support services.
Field Operations Bureau	FOB provides police services to the public, including answering emergency and non-emergency calls for service. FOB also conducts criminal investigations, handles most traffic accidents, and provides patrols and specialized services in individual police districts.

⁹⁸ Source: City of New Orleans, New Orleans Police Department website, <http://www.nola.gov/nopd/about-us/bureaus/>.

NOPD UNIT DIVISIONS BY DISTRICT

First District (88)*	Second District (82)	Third District (80)	Fourth District (73)
Platoon 1 Platoon 2 Platoon 3	Platoon A Platoon B Platoon C	Platoon A Platoon B Platoon C	Platoon A Platoon B Platoon C
DIU Property DIU Persons DIU Staff			
Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics Invest
Quality of Life Staff	Quality of Life Office Staff	Quality of Life Admin Staff	Quality of Life Office Staff
School Resource COPS Platoon	School Resource Magazine Prom	School Resource	Neighborhood Pol
‡Detailed/Other	Detailed	Detailed	

*Total assigned force strength

‡ Officers who appeared on the Manpower Report but were not available for regular assignment.

Fifth District (90)	Sixth District (88)	Seventh District (92)	Eighth District (115)
Platoon 1 Platoon 2 Platoon 3	Platoon A Platoon B Platoon C	Platoon Day Platoon Evening Platoon Night	Platoon A Platoon B Platoon C
DIU Property DIU Persons DIU Staff	DIU Property DIU Persons DIU Staff	DIU Property DIU Persons DIU Staff	DIU Property DIU Persons DIU Staff
Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics	Task Force Narcotics
Quality of Life Office Staff	Crime Prevention/ Quality of Life Admin Staff	Quality of Life Staff	Quality of Life Admin
	School Resource Magazine St.		Day Beats Canal St. Bourbon Prom French Market Mounted Homeless
Extended Leave	Temp Budget	Extended	Temporary BU

**NOPD DISTRICT UNITS: FUNCTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS, MAY
2013 MANPOWER REPORT**

Platoons	Each district had three shifts of platoons, which were responsible for patrol and answering calls for service, in addition to administrative and other duties.
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District Investigative Units	Each district has two or three District Investigative Units (DIU or Investigations) that investigated crimes against persons and property in their districts. They did not investigate homicides and sex crimes, which were handled by investigators in a centralized unit.
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Task Force and Narcotics Units	Each district had one task force and a Narcotics Unit that investigated minor street level crimes and narcotics. Narcotics units operating out of headquarters investigated city-wide drug-related activities and handled more complex investigations and crimes.
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Quality of Life Officers	Each district also had officers assigned to answer residents' concerns about quality of life issues such as abandoned cars, blighted houses, and noise.
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Specialized Units	Most districts had specialized units devoted to particular needs of the district. For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• School Resource (First, Second, Third, Sixth)• Magazine Street Promenade (Second, Sixth)• Mounted, Homeless, French Market, and Bourbon Promenade (Eighth)
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NOPD DISTRICT PLATOON PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS, MAY 2013
MANPOWER REPORT

First District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	0	2
SGT	2	3	3	8
PO	13	14	12	39
Total	16	18	15	49

Second District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	1	3
SGT	3	3	2	8
PO	10	10	10	30
Total	14	14	13	41

Third District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	0	2
SGT	3	3	3	9
PO	9	11	10	30
Total	13	15	13	41

Fourth District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	0	1	1	2
SGT	3	3	2	8
PO	10	11	9	30
Total	13	15	12	40

Fifth District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	1	3
SGT	3	3	3	9
PO	14	14	13	41
Total	18	18	17	53

Sixth District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	1	3
SGT	3	3	2	8
PO	12	12	9	33
Total	16	16	12	44

Seventh District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	1	3
SGT	3	3	2	8
PO	15	18	12	45
Total	19	22	15	56

Eighth District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
LT	1	1	1	3
SGT	2	3	2	7
PO	9	8	10	27
Total	12	12	13	37

TOTAL PLATOON STAFFING BY DISTRICT AND SHIFT, MAY 2013
MANPOWER REPORT

District	A Platoon	B Platoon	C Platoon	Total
First	16	18	15	49
Second	14	14	13	41
Third	13	15	13	41
Fourth	13	15	12	40
Fifth	18	18	17	53
Sixth	16	16	12	44
Seventh	19	22	15	56
Eighth	12	12	13	37
Total	121	130	110	361

OFFICER-TO-POPULATION RATIOS IN NEW ORLEANS, 1990-2012

Officer-to-population ratios may be especially misleading in New Orleans, where the population numbers have fluctuated dramatically since 1990. New Orleans population declined steadily between 1990 and 2005, but the population dropped precipitously after Hurricane Katrina. It has risen steadily since then, but it has remained below its pre-Katrina level. The number of police officers varied over this period as well, but the changes were not as great as the differences in the city's population over the same period.

In fact, results from comparisons of officers to population in New Orleans depend entirely on when the comparison was done and may fluctuate widely. Historical comparisons for New Orleans illustrate this point and can be seen in the figure below.⁹⁹

New Orleans Population, Number of Sworn Officers, and
Officer-to Population Ratios, 1990-2012

	Population of New Orleans	Number of Sworn Officers	Officers per 1,000¹⁰⁰
1990	497,000	1,397	2.8
2000	485,000	1,650	3.4
2007	220,614	1,425	6.5
2010	343,829	1,452	4.2
2012	369,250	1,215	3.2

⁹⁹ Brian A. Reaves and Matthew J. Hickman, *Special Report: Police Departments in Large Cities, 1990-2000* (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., May 2002), accessed February 15, 2014, <http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=826>; and "Law Enforcement Officers Per Capita for Cities, Local Departments," *Governing the States and Localities (August 30, 2012)*, accessed February 10, 2014, www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/law-enforcement-police-department-employee-totals-for-cities.html. For census information, see censusviewer.com/city/LA/New%20Orleans. Population numbers for 2013 were not yet available. Brian A. Reaves, *Local Police Departments, 2007* (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., 2010), 34, accessed February 15, 2014, www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ In 2007 only Washington, D.C. had more officers per person, at 6.7. The large increase in the officer-to-person ratio was the direct result of the large decrease in the population of New Orleans immediately following Hurricane Katrina.

Even with the decline in the number of officers per resident since 2007, NOPD's officer-to-population ratio has consistently placed it among the top seven large U.S. cities with populations over 250,000 for the last five years.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Reaves and Hickman, *Police Departments in Large Cities*. For 2010 numbers, see "Law Enforcement Officers Per Capita for Cities, Local Departments," *Governing the States and Localities* (August 30, 2012), accessed February 11, 2014, www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/law-enforcement-police-department-employee-totals-for-cities.html; Reaves, *Local Police Departments*, 34; and U.S. Census QuickFacts, accessed May 8, 2014, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/2255000.html>. For 2012 census information, see <http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk>. Large cities include cities with populations of over 250,000.

DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

The City lists all calls for service on the www.data.nola.gov website. The city reported receiving 503,968 calls in 2012 and 461,775 calls in 2013. However, many of these calls are not citizen-generated calls for service; the list includes officer self-initiated activities. In fact the list “may grossly exaggerate, perhaps by three-or four-fold, the number of citizen-generated calls.”¹⁰² Evaluators requested all of NOPD’s citizen-generated calls for service for 2012 and received data on 320,339 calls.¹⁰³

A recent survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) provides insight into the frequency of contacts between citizens and the police. According to the survey, an estimated 26 percent of the 241.4 million U.S. residents age 16 or older had one or more contacts with police, such as calling to report a crime, being stopped in a moving vehicle, or being approached by an officer in a public place.

However, the table below shows that only 13 percent of the 241.4 million U.S. residents actually *requested police assistance* and an additional 3.1 percent reported a traffic accident. BJS’s results suggested that NOPD’s list of 320,339 citizen-generated calls for service included a much higher number of citizen-generated calls for service than expected.

Evaluators reexamined the calls for service data, and in consultation with NOPD, excluded all traffic “incidents,” “duplicate,” “null,” and “void” calls. The resulting data set used in this analysis included 264,224 citizen-generated 2012 calls for service.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Wilson and Weiss, *A Performance-Based Approach*, 29.

¹⁰³ In this report and in discussions of the data analysis conducted for this evaluation, “Calls for Service” refers to citizen-generated calls for service only; we did not include data generated by CAD which captured all officer activity.

¹⁰⁴ There were categories of calls for which it was difficult to determine whether the call was citizen or officer generated; all of those calls were included in the analysis. It is also possible that some discretionary activities remained in the data set, but rather than exclude a citizen-generated calls for service inadvertently, these were left in the final data set. Table below was excerpted from the United States Department of Justice, *Special Report: Request for Police Assistance: National Crime Victimization Survey, Police-Public Contact Survey, 2011*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, September, 2011), accessed March 30, 2014, <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpa11.pdf>.

**U.S. residents age 16 or older who had contact with police,
by reason for contact, 2011**

Reason for contact with police	Number	Percent
Total	62,937,000	26.1%
Requested assistance	31,405,000	13.0%
Reported crime/disturbance/suspicious activity	19,737,000	8.2
Reported noncrime emergency	12,566,000	5.2
Other reason ^a	3,900,000	1.6
Stopped/approached by police ^b	35,425,000	14.7%
Involved in a traffic accident reported to police	7,434,000	3.1%
Participated in an anti-crime program with police	3,490,000	1.4%

Note: Data based on the 241,404,000 U.S. residents age 16 or older in 2011. Numbers and percentages include persons who experienced contact with police anytime during 2011. Detail sums to more than total because some persons had more than one type of contact with police in 2011. Number of persons who requested police assistance rounded to nearest thousand. See appendix table 1 for standard errors.

^aIncludes other reasons for approaching or seeking help from police, such as asking for directions, having a problem with an animal, or returning a lost item.

^bIncludes persons who had involuntary contact that was initiated by the police such as being pulled over in a moving vehicle, being arrested for a crime, or being approached for some other reason (e.g., police were providing a service or conducting a criminal investigation).

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Police-Public Contact Survey, 2011.

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF 2012 CITIZEN-GENERATED CALLS FOR SERVICE BY TYPE OF CALL

Type	Count	% of Total Citizen-Generated CFS
Complaint Other	59,156	22%
Disturbance (Other)	40,837	15%
Burglar Alarm Silent	36,691	14%
Suspicious Person	16,325	6%
Auto Incident	12,202	5%
Domestic Disturbance	6,581	2%
Hit & Run	5,819	2%
Lost or Stolen	5,113	2%
Silent E-911 call	4,436	2%
Ambulance Request	4,354	2%
Theft	4,224	2%
Reckless Driving	4,175	2%
Fight	4,144	2%
Fugitive Attachment	4,101	2%
Mental Patient	3,896	1%
Simple Criminal Damage	3,550	1%
Auto Incident with Injury	3,119	1%
Simple Battery Domestic	2,923	1%
Simple Battery	2,736	1%
Auto Theft	2,733	1%
Discharging Firearms	2,718	1%
Residence Burglary	2,577	1%
Theft from Interior	2,424	1%
Return for Additional Information	2,192	1%
Prowler	2,009	1%
All other calls ¹⁰⁵	25,190	9%

¹⁰⁵ "All other calls" includes 117 additional categories, each with less than 1 percent of the total number of calls for service.

METHODOLOGY: STEPS FOR CALCULATING STAFFING ESTIMATES, NARRATIVE EXPLANATION AND TABLE

The steps below explain the methodology used to calculate staffing estimates, illustrated in the following table. *(Examples in the text below were taken from the First District’s night watch platoon, 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.)* To calculate the staffing estimates, evaluators:

Determined the:	By:
Number of Adjusted Calls for Service	Calculating the total number of citizen-generated calls for service for each platoon in each district and adjusting each total for the percentage of Code Two calls that require two responding officers. ¹⁰⁶ 7,448 (calls for service) X .44 (percent of Code Two calls) = 3,277 7,448 (calls for service) + 3,277 (Code Two calls for service) = 10,725 Adjusted Calls for Service
Time in Hours on Calls for Service	Multiplying the average total time per call (.75 hours or 45 minutes) by the adjusted number of calls for service to determine the total number of hours of work generated by calls for service. 10,725 (adjusted calls for service) X .75 (45 min.) = 8,043 Total hours on Calls for Service

¹⁰⁶ According to NOPD Operations Manual Chapter 81.1: Communications, “[d]ispatchers shall assign a backup unit in response to incidents involving violence or have a potential for violence.” Evaluators based their calculations on the fact that the policy includes most Code Two calls for service.

Minimum Number of Officers Required at 100% Time on Calls for Service *without* Shift Relief Factor

Dividing the total adjusted calls for service hours by the total “possible hours worked” (from the shift relief calculation), which yielded the minimum number of officers needed to answer calls for service. *(Note: the minimum number of officers required is the minimum number needed to answer calls for service if an officer spent 100 percent of his time answering calls for service and took no time off.)*

8,043 (total hours on calls for service) ÷ **3,123** (maximum possible hours worked)

= 2.57 Minimum Number of Officers Required

Minimum Number of Officers Required at 100% Time on Calls for Service *with* Shift Relief Factor

Multiplying the minimum number of officers needed without the shift relief factor by the 1.62 shift relief factor for NOPD.

2.57 (minimum number officers required) X **1.62** (shift relief factor)

= 4.16 (Officers needed at 100% time)

Number of Officers Needed for 50, 40, and 30 Percent Time Spent Answering Calls for Service

Dividing the minimum number of officers needed by the percentage of time the officer is obligated to answer calls for service.

4.16 officers ÷ .50 = 9

4.16 officers ÷ .40 = 11

4.16 officers ÷ .30 = 14

The column titled “Officers Assigned to Answer Calls for Service in May 2013” shows the number of officers in each platoon as of the May 2013 Manpower Report.¹⁰⁷

Additional Officers Needed to Cover Citizen-Generated Calls for Service

The **red** numbers in parentheses show the number of additional officers needed to meet the workload demand at 50, 40, and 30 percent time answering calls for service in May 2013.

¹⁰⁷ The number of police officers ranking PO I – IV assigned to each platoon in May 2013 minus one officer assigned as the “desk officer” for each shift.

Evaluators' analyses of calls for service showed minor variations by day of the week and month of the year, 7 and 9 percent respectively, for which NOPD should not need to make any major adjustments.

Shift	Total Adjusted Calls for Service	Time on Calls for Service (Hours)	Officers Required w/o Shift Relief Factor @ 100% Calls for	Shift Relief Factor	Officers Required with Shift Relief Factor @ 100% Calls for Service	Officers Required for % of Time Spent Answering Calls for Service			Officers Assigned to answer Calls for Service in May 2013			
			Service		for Service	50%	40%	30%				
1st District (44% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	10,725	8,043	2.57	1.62	4.16	9	(2)	11	(0)	14	(3)	11
7am-3pm	16,482	12,362	3.95	1.62	6.40	13	(1)	17	(5)	22	(10)	12
3pm-11pm	17,823	13,367	4.27	1.62	6.92	14	(1)	18	(5)	24	(11)	13
2nd District (48% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	9,596	7,199	2.30	1.62	3.73	8	(1)	10	(1)	13	(4)	9
7am-3pm	16,360	12,270	3.92	1.62	6.35	13	(4)	16	(7)	22	(13)	9
3pm-11pm	19,384	14,538	4.64	1.62	7.52	16	(7)	19	(10)	26	(17)	9
3rd District (51% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	12,533	9,400	3.00	1.62	4.86	10	(1)	13	(4)	17	(8)	9
7am-3pm	20,402	15,301	4.89	1.62	7.92	16	(8)	20	(12)	27	(19)	8
3pm-11pm	22,627	16,971	5.42	1.62	8.78	18	(8)	23	(13)	30	(20)	10
4th District (45% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	7,679	5,759	1.84	1.62	2.98	6	(2)	8	(0)	10	(2)	8
7am-3pm	11,819	8,864	2.83	1.62	4.58	10	(1)	12	(3)	16	(7)	9
3pm-11pm	15,016	11,262	3.60	1.62	5.83	12	(2)	15	(5)	20	(10)	10
5th District (46% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	11,735	8,802	2.81	1.62	4.55	10	(2)	12	(0)	16	(4)	12
7am-3pm	14,293	10,720	3.42	1.62	5.54	12	(1)	14	(1)	19	(6)	13
3pm-11pm	19,133	14,350	4.58	1.62	7.42	15	(2)	19	(6)	25	(12)	13
6th District (49% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	11,044	8,283	2.64	1.62	4.28	9	(1)	11	(3)	15	(7)	8
7am-3pm	17,543	13,157	4.20	1.62	6.80	14	(3)	18	(7)	23	(12)	11
3pm-11pm	21,109	15,832	5.10	1.62	8.26	17	(6)	21	(10)	28	(17)	11
7th District (51% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	14,926	11,195	3.60	1.62	5.83	12	(1)	15	(4)	20	(9)	11
7am-3pm	19,677	14,758	4.70	1.62	7.61	16	(2)	20	(6)	26	(12)	14
3pm-11pm	23,734	17,801	5.70	1.62	9.23	19	(2)	24	(7)	31	(14)	17
8th District (39% Code 2)												
11pm-7am	17,782	13,337	4.30	1.62	6.97	14	(5)	18	(9)	24	(15)	9
7am-3pm	17,536	13,152	4.20	1.62	6.80	14	(6)	18	(10)	23	(15)	8
3pm-11pm	18,212	13,659	4.40	1.62	7.13	15	(8)	18	(11)	24	(17)	7

OIG Comment on City's Response:

The workload-based approach recommended by our nationally recognized expert was based on the assumption that allocating sufficient resources to citizen-based calls for service is the baseline of policing, simply because citizens' calls must be answered, and time spent on calls for service can be verifiably quantified.

In doing so, the report did not diminish the importance of other policing functions. In contrast, it recognizes that allocating a significant portion of officers' time on other important activities, such as community policing,¹⁰⁸ is a key policy decision that should be made by a police department's leaders. OIG provided the information in the report in an effort to facilitate NOPD's efforts toward that end.

The OIG would like to clarify the following points:

Finding 1: Evaluators cited 59,156 Signal 21 ("complaint other") calls for service for which there was no descriptive information *in addition to* approximately 7,600 additional instances of 2012 calls for service that use Signal 21 sub-categories. Our expert identified the use of the non-specific Signal 21 categories as a problem for supervisors trying to manage officers' time.

NOPD's response asserts that police leaders "know what type of incident is NOT in the Signal 21 classification." However, OIG's recent *Performance Audit of the New Orleans Police Department's Uniform Crime Reporting of Forcible Rapes* suggests otherwise: auditors identified 20 incidents from their sample of 90 forcible rape offenses that were misclassified to a miscellaneous offense (Signal 21) instead of a Part I or Part II UCR offense. OIG investigators also found 177 of 803 incidents

¹⁰⁸ In its 2011 *Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department*, DOJ made the point that NOPD staffing reflected its "emphasis on arrests and statistics," and as a result, it engaged in "crime suppression tactics that the Department call[ed] proactive policing." The point DOJ made was that NOPD's definition of proactive policing stood in contrast to proactive policing as an element of community policing, which is focused on preventing crime by engaging the public in order to solve a community's problems.

improperly classified as Signal 21 or 21L in its *Report of Inquiry into Improper Classification of Crime Reporting by the New Orleans Police Department 8th District*.

Finding 2: Of the 264,225 citizen calls for service recorded in the computer aided dispatch system (CAD), evaluators found no sub-priority above “h” recorded in the data set. Communications District personnel supported this conclusion. District commanders and supervisors concurred; they were either unsure of or unaware that the sub-priorities existed and reported that they did not use them when making decisions about prioritizing calls awaiting dispatch.

Finding 5: OIG did not recommend pulling detectives from homicide or child abuse assignments to answer calls for service. According to information NOPD personnel provided to evaluators in interviews, the positions OIG identified did not include “proactive or critical investigative duties.”

In May 2013 NOPD had 1,215 sworn officers. If 312 were needed to answer calls for service, NOPD had 800-900 additional officers whom it could assign to other essential law enforcement activities: assigning a sufficient number of officers to answer calls for service need not result in taking officers from essential policing functions.

Finding 6: Although sergeants *may* respond to calls for service, there is no obligation for sergeants or other ranking officers to do so, and evaluators found no evidence of supervisors routinely answering calls for service.

Each Community Coordinating Sergeant (Co-Co) supervises only one or two Quality of Life officers. OIG found no evidence that Co-Cos perform duties that Quality of Life officers were not already performing or would not be capable of fulfilling.

NOPD states that desk officers handled approximately 10,000 calls for service over the course of one year; this averages to one call per shift for each desk officer.

OIG did not assert that the tasks performed by the A-case officer were unimportant; however, the case review function performed by the A-case officer could arguably be a supervisor responsibility, or it could be performed by someone other than a sworn officer.

Finding 8: NOPD posits a number of reasons why the positions OIG's expert identified as possible non-sworn positions must remain sworn. However, as explained in the report, those same positions have been become non-sworn positions in police departments across the country and the suggestions are consistent with IACP's suggestions in its *Model Policy on Civilianization*.

Findings 10 and 11: The OIG was aware that NOPD has been offered information on alternatives to officer responses to burglar alarms and minor traffic accidents in the past. However, no actions had been taken to implement these cost-saving measures.

The OIG included these recommendations in the report in an effort to prompt the City and NOPD to implement changes that could save the taxpayers money and reduce the need for additional sworn officers.

The OIG fully acknowledges the authority and responsibility of police leaders to make management decisions regarding the deployment of personnel. The OIG provided policy makers and police leaders with the information and recommendations in this report in an effort to ensure the most effective and efficient use of scarce taxpayer dollars.



Mitchell J. Landrieu
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"to protect and to serve"



Ronal W. Serpas, Ph.D.
SUPERINTENDENT

May 22, 2014

Ed Quatrevaux, Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General
City of New Orleans
525 St. Charles Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70130-3049

RE: **Evaluation of NOPD Staffing and Deployment: Meeting the Demand of Citizen Calls for Service with Existing Resources**

Dear Inspector General Quatrevaux:

Thank you for giving the New Orleans Police Department the opportunity to review and comment on your report titled "*Evaluation of New Orleans Police Department Staffing and Deployment: Meeting the Demand of Citizen Calls for Service with Existing Resources.*" It is essential that the public and policymakers clearly understand the police staffing levels required to ensure public safety in New Orleans.

That is why in 2010 one of the first things that I did after being appointed Superintendent was order a complete review of the Department's deployment patterns and staffing levels. We used the most comprehensive evaluative tools available to analyze a wide range of data. This sophisticated deep dive analysis determined that approximately 1,575 sworn officers are needed to meet our wide ranging needs including patrol, community policing, investigations, and other requirements.

Despite asserting that your report would conduct a similarly rigorous, comprehensive analysis to examine whether "NOPD [is] sufficiently staffed and organized to complete its mission efficiently and effectively," I was disappointed that the report falls far short of this goal. In fact, your report never engages in an all-inclusive staffing analysis of the department. Instead, it attempts to draw broad conclusions by evaluating only one of NOPD's many policing responsibilities – responding to citizen calls for service.

To be clear, responding to calls for service is a very important part of the department's work, but is just one of many responsibilities that must be considered when evaluating our comprehensive staffing needs. The daily needs of the city and Department are far more expansive than just answering calls for service.

The public expects and demands far more. The NOPD must be proactive, especially when it comes to addressing top citizen concerns, such as combating murder. We are currently implementing NOLA FOR LIFE, a comprehensive murder reduction strategy. Now murder is at a historic nearly 30-year low. But to get there we had to beef up the homicide unit and establish a new Multi-Agency Gang Unit. These resources should be dedicated to this top citizen priority.

Indeed, citizens have the right to expect a professional response to their calls for service, just as parents who have lost a child to violence deserve a thorough investigation so the killer can be apprehended. The same goes for victims of sexual assault, they deserve justice, and neighborhoods terrorized by drug dealers deserve to live in peace.

Here is the point – to make New Orleans safe, the Police Department must do a lot more than just respond to reports of crimes, which we all agree is only one type of the various service demands this or any police department responds to. However, any casual reader of your report would conclude that responding to calls for service is the only mission of an effective police department. This is simply not true. The old reactive approach to policing is giving way to new and innovative methods where departments are proactive and respond to community needs, not merely reactive to calls for service.

Under my direction, the NOPD has adopted this philosophy of community policing, a national best practice endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and countless police departments throughout the country. Community policing is smart because it aims to proactively address the root causes of crime by forging problem-solving partnerships with the community.

To better reflect this new approach, in 2013 the NOPD re-wrote its mission statement to emphasize its commitment to community policing strategies. In this new mission statement we pledge to “prioritize our crime fighting and quality of life initiatives by engaging each neighborhood and community organizations in collaborative problem-solving partnerships.”

Despite its primacy in NOPD’s foundational document, the staffing required to implement effective community policing is never considered in this report. Rather, your report is predicated on the assumption that “a police officer’s response to a citizen’s request for assistance may be the only interaction the citizen has with the police” – an assumption that runs directly contrary to community policing philosophies, which require proactive community engagement efforts outside of the traditional call for service paradigm. To the extent that the report acknowledges non-patrol policing duties at all, it is dismissive of them – recommending, for example, that officers be reassigned from the Domestic Violence Unit, the Juvenile Division, the Community Coordinating Sergeant program, and instead be dedicated to call for service response.

Although it discounts the benefits of community policing strategies, your report refers repeatedly to citizen expectations of NOPD, without providing any data to substantiate the assumptions it makes on this subject. This is especially discouraging because of the wealth of data collected on citizen perceptions by the New Orleans Crime Coalition’s (NOCC) biannual Citizen Satisfaction Survey. The baseline NOCC survey conducted in August of 2009 clearly identified the dramatic disconnect that existed between the NOPD and the people of New Orleans. However, the

progression of NOCC surveys over the past four years convincingly demonstrates clear improvements in citizen perceptions of NOPD officers across numerous metrics. I believe that our community policing strategies are a key reason for these improvements and I am committed to maintaining our focus on proactive policing and responding to our community's multi-faceted demands for police service.

Even the sources that your report cites to support its assumptions in actuality support NOPD's emphasis on community policing. A white paper by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is quoted several times in the report to justify your decision to look exclusively at calls for service data in evaluating NOPD staffing. However, this same white paper makes clear that this approach "has shortcomings in that it relies almost exclusively on demand through 911 calls and ignores other elements of community demands placed on a department. In order to overcome these shortcomings...workload demands should be modeled and then placed in context with other operational demands facing the department." Your report fails to provide the context required to meet this standard.

Furthermore, your report selectively quotes a 2011 report by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to support your claims that the NOPD has mistakenly prioritized proactive policing over responding to citizen generated calls for service. Your report uses this excerpt as support for its flawed assumption that "proactive policing" is a code word for an aggressive arrest policy. Simply stated, the DOJ report clearly recommends that the NOPD ensure that its staffing be in line "with a community policing philosophy" that emphasizes "proactive problem-solving" – an approach which your report criticizes us for taking. This DOJ 2011 report later served as the basis for NOPD's Consent Decree, which explicitly requires that NOPD dedicate personnel to community policing, supporting victims of domestic violence, and other policing strategies called into question in your report.

Plus, the number of arrests over the past four years has consistently fallen – and fallen at a rate faster than the attrition of officers. Furthermore, over these last few years the use of summons in lieu of a physical arrest has been dramatically increased, and sustained. Unfortunately, the report ignores this progress and fails to make a current assessment of this matter.

That being said, your report correctly notes that, "adequate staffing of citizen-generated calls for service must serve as the starting point for any police department." However, using that basic level of service as the primary – and in the case of this report – the only metric to measure workload for the entire department means that the report issues a call for policing mediocrity rather than policing excellence.

Most experts agree that it is self-defeating to orient a police department around responding to calls for service, because a department that focuses exclusively on response at the expense of proactive engagement will continually see higher and higher volumes of citizen requests for service. Only by attempting to address these complaints before they are voiced can a department effectively serve its community. Simply put, responding to calls for service means we are already late.

I strongly refute the allegation in your report that there is an “absence of verifiable evidence documenting NOPD’s personnel and operational needs.” This evidence exists and is abundant, even if the report failed to consider it. In fact, during the discovery phase of this project, NOPD provided data to OIG evaluators that inventoried the staffing needs of our centralized detective functions, although it appears that this information was never included in the final report.

From there, many other workload metrics demonstrate NOPD’s personnel needs beyond calls for service, including district and centralized investigative case loads, tourist and special event demands, SWAT and tactical warrant service, and arrests – to name only a few of the other demands not considered by your report. So while your report produced a relatively accurate estimation of the

personnel required to respond to calls for service, by not even attempting to analyze these broader workload metrics, the report failed to offer useful recommendations regarding the staffing levels of non-patrol officers. In short, by taking an analytical shortcut, the report was only able to provide staffing guidance on a portion of the NOPD’s total force.

This report is a significant missed opportunity to provide the public and policymakers with an accurate and comprehensive staffing needs assessment, despite the indication throughout the report that this was one of its primary goals. Candidly, after talking to the evaluators, and conferring with our team that transferred data about the varied demands of our profession over the last year of this evaluation, I was looking forward to a full analysis of our needs. More simply, this evaluation cannot be used to suggest in any way what the appropriate staffing level of the NOPD should be – to claim differently is completely unsupported by the data and analysis provided.

Following are our detailed responses to the OIG’s findings, observations and recommendations:

Finding 1. NOPD classified 22 percent of calls for service as “*complaint other*,” making it difficult for supervisors to use calls-for-service data to inform NOPD staffing and deployment needs.

Recommendation 1. NOPD should reduce its use of non-descriptive call-for-service classifications and use call classifications that provide qualitative information about the nature of calls for service.

Department’s Response:

NOPD has 145 signal types that are used to classify calls for service, covering everything from homicide (Signal 30) to illegal use of fireworks (Signal 94F). The Signal 21, or ‘complaint other’ series that is referenced in this recommendation has 15 sub-categories (e.g. 21C – curfew citation, 21A – abandoned property, etc.). In fact, the Corona Ops Force Deploy software that NOPD utilizes to help identify staffing requirements analyzes with great specificity all signal codes of the NOPD, including the 21 series. However, every year NOPD officers are asked to respond to thousands of different types of calls. Attempting to develop a new signal for every type of potential incident would not only be laborious, but ultimately would limit rather than enhance NOPD’s analytical capabilities. Signal 21 complaints allow supervisors to understand

how their officers' time is spent better than a dozen additional micro-categories would allow. The fact that auditors untrained in law enforcement techniques are not able to understand the types of incidents included in a Signal 21 does not mean that this signal does not provide important analytical information for experienced and trained supervisors. Further, in my experience serving as chief of police in three separate departments, the expansion of citizen demand on policing in the community policing era is consistent with what we see here in the use of the Signal 21. We expect and mandate that our officers register their time spent responding to citizen requests for service in the Computer Aided Dispatch system, so that we can determine the demand for services and effectively manage our available resources. Finally, the fact that we have and use at least 145 different designations of officer's work ***explicitly*** means we know what type of incident is NOT in the Signal 21 classification.

Finding 2. NOPD used three main categories to prioritize citizen-generated calls for service, significantly limiting information available to the officer about the nature and urgency of the call and reducing the department's ability to prioritize responses to calls for service effectively and efficiently.

Recommendation 2. NOPD should implement calls for service priority codes with descriptive information and specific instructions to guide to the officer's response.

Department's Response:

Although this recommendation correctly identifies that NOPD uses three primary categories to prioritize calls for service (Priority Codes 0-2), it neglects to mention that each of these primary categories has up to twenty-six secondary categories (a-z). NOPD receives every 911 call and immediately enters the call into a state-of-the-art Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Based upon the primary category, call signal, time received, and other factors, the CAD system then *dynamically* assigns each call for service a secondary priority rating between 'a' and 'z.' This prioritization, as well as other details about the call, are available to both the dispatcher and field supervisor. It is the dispatcher and supervisor who ultimately make the decision about how to assign officers to calls for service, given all available information about the nature and urgency of the waiting request. Although the officer in the field may not always directly have knowledge of the secondary priority rating assigned to the call they are tasked with responding to, they are provided access to detailed information about the call, both through the CAD system available in their vehicles and via radio contact with the dispatcher and supervisor. To insinuate that NOPD lacks a framework for prioritizing calls and providing vital information to officers in the field is simply inaccurate. Furthermore, the Kansas City call prioritization scheme provided as a model for NOPD to adopt has significant and unacceptable drawbacks. This framework allows for "acceptable" delays in call response, including a classification for "calls where a delay of up to four hours is acceptable." While such delays may occasionally occur due to manpower constraints, such lengthy delays should never be considered as a routine practice. NOPD's call prioritization scheme requires officers to be dispatched to every call for service as quickly as possible.

Finding 3. Platoon supervisors held calls for service in queue at shift change, creating a backlog of calls waiting to be dispatched at the beginning of next shift.

Recommendation 3. NOPD should adjust platoon shift time to alleviate the need to hold calls for service in queue; one possibility would be to stagger the starting and ending time of shifts for some officers.

Department's Response:

There are many tools at the disposal of District Commanders in order to alleviate call for service backlogs around shift changes. Many Districts deploy an 'early car' during shift changes, to provide uninterrupted response coverage. Commanders sometimes order non-patrol officers assigned to district task forces, district investigative units, and district narcotics officers to respond to calls for service during periods of high demand and specifically during times of patrol shift changes. In fact, over the past year 32.3% of all non-self-initiated calls for service have been handled by non-platoon personnel. Furthermore, all Districts are required by policy to ensure immediate response to any emergency calls broadcast during roll call. However, all of these strategies are dependent upon sufficient manpower. Without enough available officers to respond to calls for service, backlogs will inevitably develop, particularly among the non-emergency designated calls. The true cause of such backlogs is not inflexible scheduling, but rather a question of the manpower available to implement scheduling strategies. In fact, our Corona Ops Force Deploy software analyzes countless iterations of shift schedule times and assignments of officers per shift to "smooth" service demand with staffing as much as possible (we would be happy to demonstrate this functionality for your or your staff). It is a truism in American policing that the call for service demand does not break at the change of shifts, be it an eight hour, ten hour or twelve hour shift. This is a plain truth and simple fact.

Finding 4. Evaluators were unable to determine response time or on-scene times because officers did not enter arrival times for 13 percent of calls for service.

Recommendation 4. NOPD supervisors should require officers to provide arrival times when responding to calls for service.

Department's Response:

NOPD policy already requires officers to advise a dispatcher when leaving their vehicle. Our cursory review of data provided that underpins this finding to the OIG shows over 3,000 calls for service handled by either desk officers or other non-NOPD units where a 10-97 (arrival) time would not be expected. Also, over 7,000 calls for service in the information provided to your office were both dispatched and closed in one minute or less, which in our experience indicates the officer was already on-scene when dispatched. NOPD was never consulted or asked to assist auditors in providing an analysis of the data submitted. However, there are real-life situations beyond those already referenced which can prevent this information from being accurately entered into CAD. For example, when an in-progress priority call is broadcast, dispatchers will routinely inform all officers to standby and keep the radio channels clear until officers on the scene can verify that the emergency incident is under control. Such situations occur throughout the day, attempting to record arrival times at non-emergency calls may potentially jeopardize the safety of the officers responding to the emergency call and thus officers are not required to radio

in their arrival. Since it is not uncommon for as many as three Districts to use the same radio channel due to current staffing challenges, emergency calls can impact the accurate recording of non-emergency calls across multiple Districts.

Finding 5. In May 2013 most platoons did not have sufficient manpower to meet the demand of citizen-generated calls for service at 50 and 40 percent time answering calls for service, none of the platoons were sufficiently staffed to meet the demand.

Recommendation 5. NOPD should increase the number of officers assigned to handle calls for service while pursuing options for reducing the demand.

Department's Response:

NOPD agrees that additional officers are needed to adequately staff District platoons. According to the calculations in this report that took nearly a year to compile, a minimum of 312 officers are needed to respond to calls for service. Our own study, completed in two days using our Corona Ops Force Deploy software, indicated that 314 officers are required. In this regard, our analysis tracks closely with your findings under an ideal staffing scenario. Today, there are only 222 officers deployed in this role. It is clear that increased manpower is essential to providing timely service to citizens and improving police response times. However, improving response times is just one of many critical missions that must be managed in consideration of resource deployment (a reality of policing as noted in the ICMA report referred to already). Citizens demand that homicides be investigated and that persons who commit child abuse are held accountable. The varied demands on police resources require serious consideration and a true staffing evaluation of a police department cannot ignore these demands. Therefore, while we concur with your conclusion that additional officers are needed to respond to calls for service, we cannot agree that pulling officers off proactive and critical investigative duties to answer calls for service is a prudent staffing strategy. For the Investigations & Support Bureau alone, our judgment and experience leads us to believe that there are 82 officer/detectives positions needed to fully support centralized investigative functions of this Bureau that are today unfilled.

Finding 6. NOPD districts have sworn officers assigned to tasks that reduce district's capacity to answer calls for service.

Recommendation 6. NOPD should maximize its capacity to answer citizen calls for service by ensuring that the most effective and efficient use is made of training law enforcement personnel.

Department's Response:

This report alleges to uncover "several instances in which officers who could be assigned to answer calls for service were assigned to other duties for which their law enforcement training and skills were not essential." On its face, this claim is extremely misleading and reflects a deep misunderstanding of the duties and responsibilities of many NOPD officers.

NOPD has long acknowledged that there are some positions currently filled by sworn personnel that could be occupied by civilians. Last year, NOPD detailed to the City Council twenty-two

sworn positions that can and should be civilianized and requested funding to hire civilians for these positions, which included IT and fleet services. No funding was provided that would allow NOPD to hire civilians and reassign these sworn officers, but NOPD will make the same request this year.

In contrast to the targeted and thoughtful civilianization approach contemplated by NOPD, the OIG's proposal to reassign 102 sworn officers is reckless, ill-advised. Additionally, the report is not even internally consistent on the subject of reassigning sworn personnel to answer calls for service. Figure 3 in the report claims that only 251 of the 361 sworn personnel assigned to district platoons actually respond to calls for service. This number is based upon the inaccurate assumption by OIG that no ranking officers respond to calls for service. Yet a dozen of the positions that are identified for civilianization are positions filled by ranking officers. In order for these personnel to be reassigned to respond to calls for service, the report is either acknowledging that ranking officers can and do respond to service demand, or is implying that these officers should be demoted. It is understandable that without a deeper analysis of the Department the OIG was unable to recommend specific staffing levels for non-patrol functions. However, this does not mean that these functions are not law enforcement responsibilities or that public safety would not suffer if sworn personnel were reassigned from these functions.

For example, the OIG recommends the reassignment of Community Coordinating (Co-Co) Sergeants based upon interviews with unnamed "members of the legislative and executive branches." This recommendation displays an ignorance of the duties of Co-Co Sergeants and ignores the fact that Co-Co Sergeants and the Quality of Life Officers they supervise are at the heart of the Department's community policing efforts. Since the program's inception in August 2010, Co-Co Sergeants have spoken at more than 3,500 meetings and reached almost 70,000 citizens. Co-Co Sergeants are trained

in Neighborhood Watch development, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Problem Oriented Policing, Community Policing, the SARA model of problem identification and problem solving, linked intimately with the City of New Orleans Quality of Life stat, and so on. This direct contact between sworn officers and citizens is absolutely essential to ensuring that citizen needs are understood and addressed and actually reduces calls for service by proactively solving community problems. For example, in the last year nearly 50% of all auto-burglary reports indicate that the vehicle was not locked or secured, and that over 100 guns were stolen from auto-burglaries in New Orleans – this is exactly the kind of data Co-Co Sergeants share with our community to help prevent crime. We would also point out that Dr. Michael Cowan, with the support of Loyola University, has held monthly meetings with Co-Co Sergeants and Quality of Life Officers to develop and deliver Community Policing and community development strategies to the people of New Orleans. Reassigning these officers to respond to calls for service would restore a 20th century mentality to a 21st century police force and be actively counterproductive by increasing call for service volume.

Reassigning desk officers and A-case officers also carries significant risk. Desk officers are the first point of contact for a citizen visiting a police station. It is true that not every police department staffs a desk function available to citizens 24 hours per day, seven days per week, but that IS the history of New Orleans and a baseline service that citizens have come to expect. At

the very least, it is unquestionable that the First and Eighth Districts, both of which directly service the millions of visitors that New Orleans receives, must have a 24/7 sworn desk officer. All desk officers also respond to citizen requests for service, even if they are not dispatched to crime scenes. In the last year, desk officers have handled approximately 10,000 citizen demands for service – all of which were resolved without recalling an officer from patrol duties. However, staffing the front desk of a police station is not a job that could be safely given to a civilian, meaning that reassigning these personnel would require no longer providing these services. Serving as the primary point of entry for all visitors to the station is a perilous occupation. As recently as 2001, two officers were shot and wounded by a gunman who walked into the 5th District station and opened fire on police. Placing an unarmed civilian in a position that could subject them to such a random act of violence would be irresponsible and potentially life threatening.

A-case officers are responsible for reviewing police reports and evidence in cases submitted to the District Attorney (DA) for prosecution as an added safeguard to ensure ministerial functions of the NOPD have been met. Moreover, department-wide efficiency has been enhanced by using A-case officers as they are able to authoritatively speak to the facts of cases investigated by district officers without requiring these officers to be removed from street patrol or work overtime in order to present their cases to the DA's Screening Office. As a result of their work, NOPD currently has a 97% acceptance rate for cases presented for review and has not experienced a '701 case' – cases where an individual detained on a felony charge is released from jail because an indictment is not secured in time – in several years. Placing unqualified personnel in this position could potentially have wide ramifications, including the release of dangerous felons or cases being declined by the DA. I would remind you that just this last February the Metropolitan Crime Commission, a decades-long observer of the rapport between the NOPD and the DA's Office, presented this agency an award in recognition of our success in establishing a more effective partnership that has resulted in significantly higher conviction rates of repeat offenders. Our A-case officers played a critical role in advancing this association and we are confident that we will see additional successes on this front in the future.

Finding 7. A lack of clear department-wide expectations regarding the deployment of sworn officers resulted in differing deployment policies and practices amount the eight NOPD districts.

Recommendation 7. NOPD should provide greater oversight and guidance on the way in which commanders use district resources while continuing to support NOPD's decentralized district management.

Department's Response:

The fact that District Commanders are empowered to enact diverse and unique deployment strategies is not a side effect of NOPD's decentralized structure; on the contrary, it is a key reason for this structure. District Commanders have extensive direct contact with the citizens and elected officials in their Districts and understand their needs better than anyone else. The Commanders that the OIG spoke with who indicated that responding to calls for service was not the top priority in their District were echoing the concerns that they have heard voiced at local community meetings and directly from citizens...I have also heard these same concerns.

However, this is clearly not how these gifted Commanders actually perform. Over the last year, the percentage of calls responded to by non-patrol officers under the command of District Commanders was 32.3%. Clearly, these conversations with evaluators did not take into full account the many responsibilities and duties of our Commanders.

While there are certainly some citizens who consider improving response times to be the most important use of police resources, there are also many who wish that their District would focus resources on homicide investigations, disassembling neighborhood gangs, dealing with blight and abandoned vehicles, sanitation issues and arresting local drug dealers. Rather than predicate their policing strategies on broad assumptions, the Commanders are charged with closely monitoring public sentiment and allocating resources according to community need. In my experience and judgment, in virtually every meeting between police leadership and community groups, the service demand for Quality of Life enforcement matches and usually surpasses the demand for fast response to what has already happened. I would also point out that this style of decentralized based policing found sustained and growing support among the citizens of New Orleans during the 1990s as found in the University of New Orleans Quality of Life Survey of that era and has been reinforced by subsequent surveys of New Orleans, as well as other cities throughout the country. Recently, in the IACP Police Chief magazine, the expert utilized by this evaluation acknowledged “that as few as 5% of police calls for service requires a rapid response”...on this matter, I am in complete agreement with the expert utilized by the OIG. It is jejune to conclude that the NOPD does not recognize the need and desire for fast response; fast response is one of many measures of policing success.

Finding 8. NOPD had a high ratio of sworn to non-sworn staff; more than 100 of its sworn positions met the International Association of Chiefs of Police criteria for duties that can be performed by civilians.

Recommendation 8. NOPD should hire more non-sworn staff to perform non-law enforcement duties and redeploy sworn officers to respond to calls for service.

Department’s Response:

The criteria used by the OIG to determine a position’s suitability for civilianization represents an extraordinarily limited view of policing, as well as a lack of understanding regarding NOPD’s legal obligations. It would be illegal, unethical, or inadvisable for NOPD to civilianize many of the positions on the list compiled in this report, including:

- Five officers assigned to SIB Building Security who provide courtroom security for the Judges of Juvenile Court, as mandated by RS 13:1568 and City Ordinances. NOPD cannot legally provide non-sworn personnel for this function, barring a change in state law.
- Four officers and one Sergeant assigned to CID Domestic Violence who investigate and respond to incidents of felony domestic violence. Contrary to the OIG’s assertion, these officers do have investigatory duties and are crucial in resolving felony-level domestic violence cases. Furthermore, these officers are required to make arrests. Not only could this work not be accomplished by civilians, but civilianizing these positions could hinder NOPD’s efforts to comply with its Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice, as

well as be in conflict with the obligations that NOPD has assumed through its Blueprint for Public Safety agreement with the New Orleans Family Justice Center and Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office. The Consent Decree requires specialized training for domestic violence detectives and requires NOPD to "assign sufficient detectives to the Domestic Violence Unit based on the calls for service." Civilianizing these positions would likely cause NOPD to fall out of compliance with this requirement.

- Nine officers, three Sergeants and one Lieutenant assigned to CID Juvenile who book juvenile offenders. These officers often must supervise juveniles until they are retrieved by a parent or guardian. During this time, the officers have a custodial relationship with the juvenile and are responsible for their safety. This duty should not be trusted to civilians so long as the juveniles are NOPD's responsibility. Further, it is clear that the Louisiana POST certification process recognizes that the supervision and maintenance of persons in custody is controlled by policy, law and practice. The NOPD abandoned the classification of "correctional officer" when custodial duties were transferred to the Orleans Parish Sheriff in the early 1980s. Our Juvenile Section detectives have custodial responsibility and obligation in processing juvenile detainees.

As stated earlier in this response, while NOPD cannot endorse all of the civilianization proposals made by the OIG, we do believe that a planned approach to civilianizing positions would be advantageous. We appreciate the OIG's footnote acknowledgement of the twenty-two positions identified for civilianization by the NOPD that were presented publicly to the City Council at the Budget Hearings last year. NOPD has actively worked to civilianize sworn positions since the late 1990s. The primary obstacle to these efforts has been a shrinking budget for civilian personnel. In 2005, NOPD was budgeted for 412 civilian positions – by 2010 this had dropped by nearly 30% to a total of 286 civilian positions. As the City faced severe budget issues, funding for civilians was reduced in order to retain sworn officers. Last fall, NOPD leadership went before the City Council to request funding to hire twenty-two civilian personnel, which would have allowed an equivalent number of sworn officers to be reassigned. However, no funding for these civilian positions was allocated in NOPD's 2014 budget, and as a result these positions are still occupied by sworn personnel. It is the understanding of the NOPD that expanding the number of full time equivalents employed by the department (civilian or sworn) must be approved, with appropriate funding, by action of the City Council.

Finding 9. NOPD had a higher ratio of sergeants to officers than the recommended average.

Recommendation 9. NOPD should widen the span of control and reduce the number of supervisors and command officers in accordance with best practice and operational needs.

Department's Response:

NOPD is currently committed to actively promoting its officers, having offered a Sergeants examination in 2013 and a Lieutenants examination in 2014. These promotions are necessary and desirable for two reasons: they are important for officer retention, and NOPD is actively recruiting new officers who will require trained and experienced supervisors. Span of control ratios are expected to rise in the coming years, as NOPD aims to accept 150 new officers in 2014 and hundreds of new officers in the years to come and does not intend to increase the current budgeted allocation of sergeants and lieutenants in the coming years. However, NOPD is also

constrained by the parameters of its Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice, which requires a minimum of a “1:8” supervisor to officer ratio. Additionally, the NOPD made a decision in 1995 to staff the Public Integrity Bureau investigators with police sergeants which currently numbers 7% of the total sergeant positions staffed. The report also fails to note that many units (e.g. the Police Academy; Fatality Unit) may have a smaller span of control than what is generally considered desirable – however, these are highly technical and special assignments that requires in our view the supervision of officers by an equally specialized and experienced sergeant. Finally, even if NOPD prioritized reducing the number of supervisors identified in this report, it has no mechanism within the Civil Service to demote these ranking personnel arbitrarily, as the OIG recommends and found in the analysis of 102 positions to be civilianized. Under Civil Service rules, ranking officers cannot simply be demoted to meet an abstract span of control standard. Working within Civil Service requirements, and judgments made by senior leadership, the department has been able to successfully reduce the number of senior level manager positions (Lieutenant through Deputy Chief) through attrition by nearly 34% since May 2010 while officer staffing has declined by 24%.

Finding 10. In 2012 a significant amount of NOPD resources were wasted responding to 36,691 burglar alarms.

Recommendation 10. The City should make revisions to City Code designed to reduce calls for service due to burglar alarms; NOPD should adopt a new policy and procedure that reflects those changes.

Department’s Response:

NOPD concurs with the OIG that false burglar alarms place a significant demand on NOPD resources. Responding to false alarms diverts officers and delays their response to other calls for service. Over the past year, NOPD has responded to nearly 47,000 “burglar alarms,” or 10.6% of total calls for service. Therefore, NOPD agrees that it is worthwhile to look at new methods of screening out false alarms, recognizing that there is some expectation on the part of citizens for a police response to a burglar alarm at their home or business. NOPD stands ready to work with the community, elected officials, and the local alarm industry to reduce the number of false alarms. It is important to note that the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and coincidentally the City, has long considered the correct response to this type of call for service, and the OIG report hardly breaks new ground in this area of service.

Finding 11. NOPD patrol officers spent a significant amount of time investigating traffic incidents that did not require the training and expertise of a law enforcement officer.

Recommendation 11. The City should include in its state legislative agenda changes to state law that permit alternative responses to traffic accidents and result in the most efficient and effective use of law enforcement resources; NOPD should adopt new policy and procedure to develop and implement alternative responses.

Department's Response:

The OIG is correct in the assertion that the recommended alternative responses cannot be implemented by NOPD without changes to state law. Since NOPD officers are not trained to visually evaluate repair costs and the overwhelming majority of accidents cause more than \$500 in damages, this statutory threshold effectively requires a sworn response to every traffic accident within Orleans Parish. NOPD agrees and would support efforts towards alternative responses to minor traffic accidents; however, the recommendation is hardly new ground.

Conclusion:

In closing, the NOPD senior leadership team, with decades of experience and training, is always ready to accept critiques and criticisms, and willingly applies remedies when deficiencies within our department are identified. Unlike the many other examples of OIG evaluations where we have found common ground to agree with auditor findings and recommendations (i.e. 21L report policies; financial audits of grants; FIC audit; etc.), in this evaluation we simply must respectfully "agree to disagree" based on the limited scope of this analysis. American policing must be proactive in problem solving, investigations, response to major tourism events and the like. This report is clearly a limited assessment of staffing needs and does NOT speak to the tremendous responsibility our department has to the people of this city.

We would like to again extend our appreciation to the Office of the Inspector General for providing this agency an opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,



Ronal W. Serpas
Superintendent of Police

cc: First Deputy Mayor & CAO Andrew Kopplin
Deputy Mayor Jerry Sneed
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